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ESSAYS ON ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
My dissertation analyzes the credible communication of seller information to buy-
ers. My rst essay, New and Improved?, considers rmsincentives to introduce
new product versions and the corresponding beliefs of consumers about such prod-
ucts quality when they have no direct information about the product other than
it is new. I nd that consumers rationally deduce new product versions are on av-
erage better and so pay a pricing premium, in turn leading some rms to exploit
the new product signal by selling new versions that are only trivially di¤erent from
their older version or that require ine¢ ciently high upgrade costs. Notwithstanding
this, I show that some new product signalingcan increase welfare by counteracting
Arrows underinvestment problem. The second essay, Physician Overtreatment and
Undertreatment with Partial Delegation, considers strategic communication from
doctors selling medical services to patients. We nd that communication problems
stemming from misaligned incentives lead the patient to being overtreated for some
health states and undertreated in others. Stronger nancial incentives for doctors
lead to more exaggeration and hence more skepticism, thereby leading to even more
exaggeration as the doctor tries to persuade the patient to accept treatment. Insur-
ance makes patients worry less about paying for overtreatment, thereby reducing the
need for doctors to exaggerate, and making each side better o¤ by reducing miscom-
munication. We also resolve an open question in the partial delegation literature by
showing that the equilibrium we examine is the most informative equilibrium.
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Introduction
The existence of asymmetric information can have a profound impact on market out-
comes, even leading to market failure, due to the less informed party to a transaction
fearing opportunism on the part of the more informed party. The fear of adverse se-
lection is known to hamper many large and important markets, including insurance,
annuities, bank lending, and equity issuances, inter alia. Many of these same markets
su¤er from moral hazard problems as well when the more informed party takes an
unobserved action, to the detriment of the other party. Both of these problems stem-
ming from asymmetric information have been cited as playing a major role in the
problems with subprime mortgages which in part led to the 200708 nancial panic
(Ashcraft and Scheurmann, 2008).
In my dissertation, I explore applications in which the more informed party to a
transaction sends a message, from which the uninformed party must draw inference
and take an action. In my rst chapter I consider the incentives of rms to invest in
improving their existing products when consumers arent initially able to determine
the incremental value of a new and improved product. Knowing they have an
information advantage, rms must rst decide how much research and development
(R&D) e¤ort to take and then which outcomes from its random R&D process are
su¢ ciently valuable to merit inclusion in the product. I label these two choices as the
ex-ante and ex-post investment decisions, respectively.
In the ex-post decision, a rm with a known distribution of R&D outcomes pri-
vately observes the value of the innovation it has developed and must decide whether
or not to adopt it. If it does adopt, it sells a new and improved version of its
product to consumers who cannot immediately determine how improved the product
is. It is assumed to be costly to introduce a new product version, and such costs can
be avoided by censoring the newly discovered innovation from the market and instead
selling the old version of the product to consumers who are informed of its value. In
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equilibrium, the rm uses a threshold strategy whereby it adopts all su¢ ciently valu-
able innovations and rejects otherwise. Inferring this threshold, consumers correctly
deduce that new products are improved on average so that they command a pricing
premium.
In determining the rms adoption threshold I show that the informational asym-
metry between rm and consumer regarding the quality of new product versions will
lead to a hidden type problem akin to adverse selection: rms that discover relatively
marginal improvements may nonetheless adopt them and charge a pricing premium
that consumers will ultimately learn is too high. In fact, rms may even introduce
trivial or harmful product improvements,or incur ine¢ ciently high upgrade costs
to sell a new version. This occurs because consumers form a pooled expectation over
all types that sell a new version, implying low types have more incentive to adopt
their innovation than under full information. That is, new product versions may be
introduced to imperfectly informed consumers even though they would be unprof-
itable if introduced to fully informed consumers. In this sense the desire to show
o¤ quality through new product signalinggives rms an extra ex-post incentive to
adopt innovations. It should be noted that in equilibrium consumersbeliefs about
a new versions quality are consistent with the rms adoption threshold so that on
average their positive inferences about new products are correct. New versions are on
average improved because of two forces that limit the hidden type problem: the up-
front costs incurred to introduce a new product version and the fact that consumers
eventually learn the products quality and so an unwarranted new product premium
will only be enjoyed temporarily.
Interestingly, I show that the seemingly excessive introduction of new versions
may actually increase welfare if there are existing market ine¢ ciencies that reduce
ex-post investment. For example, in a full information monopoly setting Arrow (1959)
showed that a rm will underinvest in product development because its private benet
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from doing so is less than the social benet. Arrows underinvestment problem, as
it is called, shows up in the new product introduction game when, ex-post, the rm
does not adopt an innovation even when total surplus would rise if it did so. I show
that this ex-post Arrow problem always exists under full information, but will be
mitigated when consumers are not initially fully informed due to the new product
signaling e¤ect. Thus from the Arrow e¤ect we expect less ex-post investment, while
from the new product signaling e¤ect we expect more. The net e¤ect of these o¤setting
forces is ambiguous, but I show that if the introduction of a new product is expensive
relative to the distribution of R&D outcomes, welfare will be higher under imperfect
than full information. Otherwise, the new product signaling e¤ect is too strong in
that it induces excessive investment that reduces welfare.
The rm also makes an ex-ante investment decision in which it decides how much
e¤ort to put into research and development, where it is assumed that more e¤ort
leads to a better distribution of outcomes. Each e¤ort level induces a distribution of
outcomes and therefore an adoption threshold for the rms ex-post investment deci-
sion. I show that under full information the Arrow underinvestment problem exists in
an ex-ante sense as well, and that in general the e¤ect of asymmetric information on
mitigating or exacerbating this problem is ambiguous. Greater e¤ort induces a better
distribution of outcomes which tends to increase prots, but this in turn induces the
(ex-post) equilibrium threshold in the subgame to fall, which I show tends to decrease
expected prots. In the end, the curvature of the distribution of R&D outcomes and
consumersvaluations for the product, as well as the cost of R&D e¤ort will all deter-
mine how new product signaling e¤ects ex-ante investment incentives. An example
is provided in which both ex-ante and ex-post investment decisions are more closely
aligned to that of the social planner under imperfect than full information so that
expected welfare is higher when consumers are initially uninformed than if they were
informed.
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Throughout the chapter I verify the robustness of the model presented by show-
ing qualitatively similar results hold for alternative model specications. For exam-
ple, in an extension I show that if consumers learn about quality through a noisy,
consumption-based process then the equilibrium characterization is much the same as
when they perfectly learn quality, but that the rms adoption threshold will be lower
so that more minor improvements are made. In fact, if the noise term in consumers
learning process and the rms R&D outcomes are independent and normally distrib-
uted then the threshold rises as the variance of the noise term declines. Intuitively,
the more accurate is consumer learning the less tolerance there can be for trivial
improvements. I also show that an alternative one-period model can be specied in
which some consumers will always be informed of product quality while others never
are, is equivalent to the two-period model I present. Finally, I show that the new
product signal has value even if a rm can revert to its old product version once its
new versions quality has been discovered, as long as reversion is costly.
In the second chapter of my dissertation I analyze communication between a
doctor and patient. This topic has received much attention because of the disparities
in information and incentives that often exist between the two: doctors are usually
better informed about the appropriateness of tests and treatments than are their
patients and they often nancially gain from o¤ering these treatments. While there is
much evidence that patients are often overtreated for medical conditions in the United
States, there is a small but growing literature on patient undertreatment stemming
from a lack of trust in healthcare providers. Each of these suggests a strong role of
misaligned incentives and asymmetric information.
I model the situation as follows. The doctor can learn the patients health state
(degree of illness), while the patient only knows the distribution of states. The pa-
tient would like to be appropriately treated for his condition, and more severe illnesses
require higher (more intensive) treatment, though the patient does take into account
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the cost of treatment. The doctor has regard for patient well-being but also derives
utility from the prots earned by providing treatment, where it is assumed more
intensive treatment leads to greater prots. Because the patient is aware of the doc-
tors incentive to exaggerate the need for treatment, he will not naively follow the
doctors advice and instead may avail himself of his outside option. Initially I model
the patients outside option to be no treatment at all, but later examine an extension
in which he may seek a second opinion from a di¤erent doctor. The modeling ap-
proach here is distinct from cheap talk because the patients set of available actions
is restricted by the doctors message (partial delegation); i.e., the patient can either
accept or reject the doctors proposed treatment but cannot prescribe to himself any
treatment he wishes.
I characterize the equilibrium of this game by nding the treatment recommenda-
tions made by the doctor as a function of the true state and the patients acceptance
or rejection of treatment as a function of the recommendation he receives. I nd that
for relatively severe health states, the doctor will recommend his own most preferred
treatment; while the patient will be able to infer the true health state is lower, his
only alternative is to reject treatment entirely. He is unwilling to do so because the
resulting under-treatment would be too severe. For relatively modest illnesses the
doctor severely exaggerates a recommendation pooled over a large enough interval of
states that the patients posterior beliefs are su¢ ciently high to induce acceptance.
Interestingly, the level of treatment here is higher than what even the doctor would
prefer. Thus the patient is severely over-treated for such health states. Finally, the
doctor recommends a pooled message for relatively low states in order to forestall
rejection, which becomes an increasingly reasonable option for lower health states.
Some states are undertreated in this case. In sum, I nd that some illnesses are
overtreated and others undertreated, but that overtreatment exists on average. One
contribution of the equilibrium characterization is that it generalizes previous mod-
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els of partial delegation (Krishna and Morgan, 2001) and nds the most informative
equilibrium that satises the intuitive criterion.
The ndings of both over- and undertreatment in a unied model with pure strat-
egy equilibria is novel and represents a contribution to the reigning physician in-
duced demand(PID) literature. This literature recognizes the information advan-
tage physicians have over their patients and posits that doctors can induce any level of
demand they wish through their treatment recommendations. One limitation of this
approach is that it does not explicitly model the patients decision making but rather
assumes the patient naively follows the doctors advice. Not surprisingly, the PID
literature nds that patients are overtreated on average because they are overtreated
for each illness. While such a model can easily explain empirical observations of av-
erage overtreatment, it cannot explain the existence of undertreatment. The model I
present therefore complements the PID literature by providing an information trans-
mission mechanism that can explain both overtreatment on average and the existence
of some undertreatment.
Independently of losses patients incur by receiving too much average treatment,
I show the average medical appropriateness of treatment declines (from either over-
or undertreatment) due to the doctors bias and patients resulting skepticism. I nd
that the decline in the average appropriateness of treatment is non-trivial; indeed, its
e¤ect on welfare losses may be greater than the average overtreatment e¤ect. I next
explore how the existence of insurance can mitigate the consequences of asymmetric
information between doctor and patient by introducing a moral hazard problem be-
tween the patient and insurer. Consider an insurance contract in which the patient
can choose a coinsurance rate (the proportion of health expenditures for which the
patient is responsible), and a competitive insurance industry that will o¤er this con-
tract at its expected cost. Buying such insurance reduces the patients ex-post cost
of treatment, since the insurer pays for some portion of health expenditures. The
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patient is therefore more willing to undergo treatment for any health state since he
is partially insulated from the marginal cost of doing so. This is the familiar ex-post
moral hazard problem of health insurance. While insurers anticipate this problem and
price policies accordingly, in the present context the patients willingness to undergo
more treatment implies the divergence in incentives between him and the doctor is
mitigated and therefore communication is improved. In fact, I nd that when health
states are uniformly distributed the average level of treatment remains constant with
respect to the coinsurance rate while the variance in treatment (relative to rst-best)
declines. Thus insurance is purely welfare improving.
Finally, it is shown that the model is robust to extensions such as the existence of
naive patients and the ability of the patient to seek second opinions. If some patients
are naive to the doctors bias and thus accept all treatment recommendations, I show
there will be no qualitative di¤erences as long as such patients make up a su¢ ciently
small proportion of the population. If this proportion is too large, though, the model
reduces to classic PID in which the doctor always recommends his own most preferred
treatment. I also show that if patients can seek a second opinion but incur a positive
search cost to do so then the main equilibrium characterization of the paper applies
in which no patient seeks a second opinion for fear of a hold-up problem by the second
doctor.
In conclusion, my dissertation consists of two chapters in which asymmetric in-
formation is shown to greatly change market outcomes from their full information
counterparts. In general, asymmetric information makes di¢ cult one party commu-
nicating e¤ectively to the other, who is rightly suspicious of being manipulated. Such
cases usually result in welfare losses when compared to the rst-best outcome. Inter-
estingly, in each chapter I show such ine¢ ciencies can be o¤set by other ine¢ ciencies:
Arrows underinvestment problem (a monopoly distortion) can be o¤set by the new
product signaling e¤ect that arises from asymmetric information, and health insur-
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ance that induces a moral hazard and thus more closely aligns doctor and patient
incentives can improve communication.
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Chapter 1: New and Improved?
Eric Schmidbauer
Abstract
Are new versions of products necessarily better? We analyze product
innovation by a rm that engages in research and development designed
to improve an existing product, the outcome of which is uncertain. If the
rm adopts the innovation its modied product appears to consumers as
new and improved,but consumers do not immediately know whether or
how much the product is better. We nd that new products are on average
improved and therefore command a pricing premium. This induces some
types to exploit the new product signal by selling new versions that are
only trivially di¤erent from their older version or that require ine¢ ciently
high upgrade costs. Nevertheless, the incentive to show o¤by introduc-
ing a new product may improve total welfare by inducing more innovation
adoption and thereby mitigating the standard monopoly underinvestment
problem. Innovation signaling provides a rational explanation for consumer
attraction to new versions of products without resort to behavioral assump-
tions such as a preference for newness.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, Signaling, Innovation
JEL Classication: D82, O31
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1 Introduction
How do consumers update their beliefs about a new or improved version of a
product before purchase? For example, how much better will a computer perform
with the newer Intel Core 2 chip than its predecessor? Should a consumer who is told
roads change by as much as 15% every yearpurchase an updated map for her GPS
device? Or suppose a familiar household cleansers packaging states WOW! Powerful
New Formula, but its price has increased by 10%. Is the touted improvement in
performance worth the higher price?
In each of these examples consumers are likely unaware of the exact value o¤ered
by the newor improvedversion of the product. This is consequential when viewed
against the backdrop of the thousands of new products that are introduced every year.
Whereas some of these products represent real technological breakthroughs, most are
incremental improvements (Olsen, 2006). The challenge for consumers is discerning the
exceptional improvements from the mundane before making a purchase decision. This
often proves di¢ cult because consumers are confronted with ...a plethora of choice, a
surge of marketing communications, decreasing inter-brand di¤erences, [and] increas-
ing complexity of information (Walsh, et al., 2007). Given their uncertain nature,
perhaps then consumers shun new products as being inherently incomprehensible and
overly risky. To the contrary, the psychology, marketing, and economics literature have
documented theoretical and empirical ndings of consumer attraction to new products.
Early studies by psychologists such as McClelland (1955) and Fiske and Maddi
(1961) nd such attraction while Rogers (1962) explains it via his notion of venture-
someness. Consumer behavior researchers in marketing have identied the closely
related constructs of inherent novelty seekingand inherent innovativeness(Midg-
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ley and Dowling, 1978; Hirschman, 1980; Foxall, 1988), the former being the desire
of the individual to seek out novel stimuli, the latter the predisposition to acquire
new products (Hirschman, 1984). A recent empirical article on the U.S. golf driver
market quanties this predisposition by nding that newnessalone induces a 25%
higher willingness to pay, where newness is dened as the most recent model available
within a brand (Lee, 2012).
While recognizing the contribution of the marketing and psychology elds in ex-
ploring consumersapparent preference for new products, we propose an alternative
signaling model that does not require an inherent preference for newness. Making their
purchase decisions under imperfect information, consumers form beliefs about new
products quality consistent with rms new product launch strategies. We nd a
newness premiumthat results from the information conveyed in equilibrium by the
very existence of the new product version.
In order to understand consumersbeliefs about new product versions we must rst
understand rms incentives to introduce such products. Firms prefer enhancements
that make their products as appealing to end-users as possible. However, easy oppor-
tunities for improvement have likely already been exploited, while technological, physi-
cal, and cost constraints limit what is feasible. Though the rm may devote signicant
resources to research and development, the outcome of such e¤orts is highly volatile
and often times results in failure (Stevens and Burley, 1997). The rm might develop
anything from a truly remarkable breakthrough to a mundane marginal improvement
whose value does not justify the upgrade costs. In any event, the rm must decide
which research outcomes to implement and which to censor from the market, knowing
that some consumers may not be willing or able to become immediately informed of
11
the new products value.
In our model a monopolist receives a random outcome from its R&D process and
must decide whether to adopt this innovation or not. The rm knows the true value of
the innovation while consumers initially only observe the binary signal of whether or
not the product has been modied. Consumers form beliefs about product value and
buy (or not) accordingly, and then learn from product trial and other sources so that
they are more informed in the second period when they repeat their purchase decision.
Our main result is that while the average quality of a modied product is higher
in equilibrium, the rm sometimes makes ine¢ cient upgrades that only marginally
improve the product. In making such a modication rms face a trade-o¤ between
inducing an initial new productpremium and the loss of future sales when the true
quality is revealed.
That the rm might incur upgrade costs to sell a new product version only trivially
di¤erent from the old may appear to unambiguously lower welfare. Indeed, we nd
that if the innovation signal is relatively strong and the rms upgrade costs relatively
low that socially ine¢ cient upgrades will be made. However, a stronger incentive to
signal may result in a net gain to welfare by o¤setting previously existing distortions.
It is well known that under full information a monopolist has less marginal incentive
to make costly upgrades than does the social planner due to the rms inability to
appropriate all of the benets of the innovation (Arrow, 1959). In the present context,
a rm may reject a product innovation whose upgrade expense is justied by the
increase in welfare but not prots. By providing an additional incentive to make a
product upgrade, the innovation signal alleviates Arrows underinvestment problem
and so may increase welfare.
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A contribution of this article is the development of a rational model explaining con-
sumersreliance upon new and improvedlabels as a signal of product quality. Thus
we explain an empirically common marketing practice without invoking consumers
cognitive biases or inherent preference for newness. Interestingly, consumers ratio-
nally infer higher quality from new products notwithstanding their knowledge that the
rm sometimes knowingly makes trivial or even ine¢ cient product modications. As
a further contribution we show innovation signaling can increase welfare by alleviating
the monopoly underinvestment problem through incentivizing investment in socially
benecial product upgrades that otherwise would not be made. In addition to ro-
bustness checks we also establish a su¢ cient condition under which the rm prefers to
ex-ante commit to sell only those new versions it would sell to fully informed consumers.
1.1 Relation to prior literature
We model a situation close to that of Milgrom and Roberts (1986), who themselves
formalized ideas proposed by Nelson (1970 and 1974). In their model, a monopolist
has private information about its exogenously determined product quality and must
choose price and dissipative advertising expenditures that induce beliefs among con-
sumers who are uninformed in the rst period but informed thereafter. As Milgrom and
Roberts describe it, theirs is a model ...in which the rms R&D e¤ort has generated a
product of some particular given quality that the rm must decide how to introduce.
We instead consider the antecedent question of whether such a product should be intro-
duced at all. In our context, an extant product undergoes R&D designed to improve it,
though the random outcome of this process may result in a trivially di¤erent product.
While keeping other relevant variables xed we focus attention on the rms censoring
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decision: will the rm incur upgrade costs to introduce the new version of the product
or not? Ultimately which types do so will determine the signaling value of a new and
improvedproduct version.
The Milgrom and Roberts result has many variants and extensions applied to
monopoly (Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984; Wilson, 1985; Horstmann and MacDonald,
1994; Daughety and Reinganum, 1995), duopoly (Fluet and Garella, 2002; Yehezkel,
2008) and oligopoly (Janssen and Roy, 2010). Price signaling can even occur in a one-
period model when some proportion of consumers is informed about product quality
(Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Linnemer, 2002). The common thread among each of
these models is a rm choosing marketing variables such as price or advertising to
signal its exogenous quality. We instead consider the decision to adopt or reject an
exogenously determined R&D outcome as itself a marketing decision capable of sig-
naling product quality. Because every new and improvedproduct is the output of a
random R&D process that has survived the rms censoring rule, the existence of the
new product version may serve as a signal of improved quality.
To a limited extent then, our rm has some control over its products quality.
However, our model di¤ers from the endogenous quality literature that focuses on the
moral hazard problem of the rm. In that literature stream, it is assumed the rm
derives a cost benet from supplying a low-quality product while purporting it is of
high-quality. Consequently, a rm with both high quality and cost may su¤er from
consumer wariness of being cheated and thus a corresponding low willingness to pay.1
1Various mechanisms have been proposed to ameliorate this problem, including reputation or
o¤ering a brand name as collateral (Spence, 1977; Klein and Le­ er, 1981; Allen, 1984; Wernerfelt,
1988), price signaling (Wolinsky, 1983) as well as risk-sharing devices such as warranties (Grossman,
1981) and money-back guarantees (Mann and Wissink, 1988). Biglaiser (1993) models middlemen as
quality guarantors while Miklos-Thal and Schumacher (2013) examine the role of third-party monitors.
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Our basic model di¤ers from such models in two main respects. First, our rms
quality choice is limited to accepting or rejecting a random R&D outcome, not a
deterministic choice as in endogenous quality models. Second, we have no di¤erence in
production costs between types, a crucial component of endogenous quality models. In
our extended model we endogenize the R&D distribution but do so through an ex-ante
investment that is publicly observable and therefore not subject to moral hazard.
We focus on innovation signaling as a particular way to transmit private information
from sellers to buyers, though many other mechanisms exist. Daughety and Reinganum
(2008) model the choice between costly disclosure and signaling of product quality
while Lizzeri (1999) explores the strategic revelation of information by certication
intermediaries. In Chakraborty, Gupta and Harbaugh (2006) a seller can credibly rank
the quality of di¤erent goods and in Cai, Riley and Ye (2007) a seller in an auction
may signal quality through her selection of the reserve price. As in these papers we
focus on quality as a vertical attribute, though sellers may also want to communicate
information about horizontal attributes that a¤ect the match value to buyers (Anderson
and Renault, 2006; Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou, 2009; Anand and Shachar, 2011).
Finally, our nding that a rm may introduce a newversion only trivially di¤er-
ent from the old relates to prior work in which the rm degrades or otherwise denies
the consumer the full value of its product. For example, Denekere and McAfee (1996)
showed that rms may crimptheir productsdegrade the performance of a product
and sell both the high and low quality versionsfor the purpose of price discrimination
between segments of consumers with di¤erent valuations for a good. Monopolists often
times engage in planned obsolescencewhereby they produce goods with uneconom-
ically short useful lives, forcing customers to make otherwise unnecessary repeat pur-
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chases (Bulow, 1986). And in some instances rms may withhold superior-performing
but lower-margin products until competitive pressures force them to introduce the
product.
1.2 Imperfectly informed consumers
It should be no wonder that consumers are imperfectly informed about a products
value. The shear number of new products a consumer might confront in a given year
is mind-boggling. By one estimate, approximately 30,000 new consumer products are
launched annually and 80 to 95% of these end up as failures.2 Some of these products
are completely new in that they serve a market that did not previously exist, while oth-
ers are enhancements of extant products. Firms engage in such innovation in order to
enhance product e¤ectiveness and appeal to consumers, as well as maintain a competi-
tive advantage over rivals. It is for this reason that Sun MicrosystemsCEO Jonathan
Schwartz calls innovation the key to survival3 while former Proctor and Gamble
CEO A.G. Laey asserts that innovation is ...the real source of sustainable compet-
itive advantage and the most reliable engine of sustainable growth.4 However, the
value of such new innovations is often unclear to consumers, who face ...a plethora of
choice, a surge of marketing communications, decreasing inter-brand di¤erences, [and]
increasing complexity of informationthat often leads to consumer confusion (Walsh,
Hennig-Thurau and Mitchell 2007).
2Nobel, C. (Feb 14, 2011). Clay Christensens milkshake marketing.Research & Ideas. Har-
vard Business School: Working Knowledge. Gourville, J. (June 2006). Eager sellers stony buyers:
understanding the psychology of new-product adoption.Harvard Business Review, 99106.
3Schwartz, J (2006, Sept 12), The ve founding principles that drive innovation.The Financial
Times.
4Laey, A.G. and R. Charan (2008). The Game-Changer: How You Can Drive Revenue and Prot
Growth with Innovation. New York: Crown Business.
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Further confounding matters is the fact that not all product modications improve
performance. A rm may add an attribute to its product that is trivial, which is
generally dened in the marketing literature as an attribute that appears valuable but,
on closer examination, is irrelevant to creating the implied benet(Carpenter, Glazer
and Nakamoto 1994). For instance, one may wonder if a shampoo with provitamin
ingredients such as Pantene Pro-V promotes healthy hair more than a similar product
without such ingredients. It will not, according to Consumer Reports.5 In its tests
the consumer advocacy group found that vitamins and provitamins have no benecial
e¤ect on hair, which after all consists of dead cells. Consider also the presence of
T25 breath fresheners in the mouthwash Scope. A little research reveals that T25
is merely a trademark for antiseptic agents long contained in the product.6 Finally,
consider Proctor & Gambles instant Folgers co¤ee brand which contain aked co¤ee
crystalsthat are created through a unique, patented process.Such crystals do not
provide for a more avorful cup of co¤ee because the shape of the co¤ee particle is
relevant for ground but not instant co¤ee (Carpenter, Glazer, and Nakamoto 1994).
Less intuitive and perhaps more rare are harmful product modications. The Ger-
man language has a word for such a concept: schlimmbesserung, meaning an im-
provement that makes things worse (Rheingold, 2000). As an example, consider the
megapixel specication of a digital camera. Product review website CNET.com wrote
in its 2010 Digital Camera Buying Guide7:
Most digital cameras these days have su¢ ciently high resolution that
5Consumer Reports (2000). Head games: some shampoo claims are just a lot of lather. 65(9),
1821.
6United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (2011). T25 trademark owned by Proctor & Gamble
Co., http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser=serial&entry=72190111 Accessed November 21, 2011.
7CNET.com (2010). Digital camera buying guide. How many megapixels should my digital camera
have?http://reviews.cnet.com/2719-7603_7-268-2.html?tag=page;page Accessed Nov 21, 2011.
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you dont need to worry about too few pixels. You may need to worry
about too many, however, since the resulting larger le sizes can result in
slower shooting for point-and-shoot models. Given how much confusion
there still is about this, it bears stating explicitly: More megapixels
does not necessarily mean better photo quality...Just because last
years model had a 12-megapixel sensor and this years replacement has
a 14-megapixel sensor doesnt mean that the new one will shoot better
photos than the old. In point-and-shoot cameras, manufacturers increase
resolution for marketing and cost reasons, rarely for quality reasons.
For this reason CNET.com advises only the serious amateurwho requires pro-
fessional level controland expects to create prints that are 8x10 inches or larger on
a high-quality photo printerto purchase a camera with 12 megapixels or higher. For
all other consumers, the resolution of the camera doesnt matterfor photo quality.
Thus most non-professional users will nd the performance of a camera degraded from
higher resolution because the larger le sizes cause slower shooting and leave room
for fewer pictures on a memory card. As is made clear from CNETs review, however,
many consumers in this market appear to be unaware of this.
As another example consider Alberto Natural Silk Shampoo. The product includes
silk in the shampoo and was (truthfully) advertised with We put silk in a bottle,
implying to consumers that their hair will become silky upon use. However, this
advertising campaign contrasts with the admission by a company spokesman that silk
doesnt really do anything for hair.8 If silk is added to a shampoo bottle of xed
volume then it displaces some of the non-silk product. Ceteris paribus, the consumer
8Adweek. (1986, May 19). Silk in a Bottle.p.18.
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is slightly worse o¤.
The legal basis for practices such as these is murky. In general, deceptive advertising
or making fraudulent claims about a product is prohibited9, but rms also enjoy broad
leeway in pu¢ ngtheir products to make a sale.10 In any event, we will be examining
the existence of a new product as itself a signal of quality and regarding any specic
communication by the rm about its quality as not credible (pace Chakraborty and
Harbaugh, 2010).
1.3 Costly information acquisition
Consumers are not helpless when confronted with a purchase decision under uncer-
tainty. Numerous outlets are available through which consumers can search for product
information, including word-of-mouth communication, consumer review websites, and
published materials such as Consumer Reports. Hawkins and Mothersbaugh (2010)
distinguish search as being internal or external. Internal search consists of using rele-
vant information from memory to solve a problem while external search is the process
of seeking information outside of the consumer such as marketing materials, opinions
of friends and strangers, professional product reviews, and direct experiences through
product inspection and trial. External search occurs when internal search is insu¢ cient,
in which case the consumer can be said to be imperfectly informed.
Although many sources of external information are available to the consumer, the
marketing literature is clear in its conclusion that [m]ost purchases are a result of
9E.g., Indiana Code S24-5-0.5.1 forbids deceptive practices while S24-5-0.5-3 and S35-43-5-3 pro-
hibit false and fraudulent advertisements.
10In Better Living, Inc. et al., 54 F.T.C. 648 (1957), a¤d, 259 F.2d 271 (3rd Cir. 1958), the Federal
Trade Commission dened pu¤ery as a term frequently used to denote the exaggerations reasonably
to be expected of a seller as to the degree of quality of his product, the truth or falsity of which cannot
be precisely determined.
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nominal or limited decision making and therefore involve limited external search im-
mediately prior to purchase,while even for major purchases . . . external information
search is skewed toward limited search, with the greatest proportion of consumers
performing little external search immediately prior to purchase(Hawkins and Moth-
ersbaugh, 2010).11 Claxton, Fry, and Portis (1974) concur: prepurchase search is a
relatively limited activity, even in the case of major durables.
There are many plausible explanations for this. First, the information simply may
not be available to a consumer. Consumer Reports, for example, does not review new
variants of chewing gum. Second, even if reliable information regarding product quality
exists, it may be too costly to obtain or its acquisition may not confer much benet
(Stigler, 1961). Here cost includes both monetary costs such as the subscription fee
to review website Angies List and non-monetary expenses such as physical and psy-
chological e¤ort. Benets may arise from a lower price, a higher quality, a preferred
style, or reduced perceived risk (Hawkins and Mothersbaugh, 2010). Third, psycholog-
ical reasons such as the degree of involvement with a product category, the perceived
risk of the purchase, and the amount of mental energy a consumer has available may
explain why some consumers do not obtain prepurchase quality information. Finally,
rms may hinder consumer acquisition of information and obscure product characteris-
tics as a means of achieving oligopoly pricing power in an otherwise competitive market
(Scitovsky, 1950; Kalayci and Potters, 2011).
Consumers may also encounter product information through non-search processes
such as advertising, unsolicited word-of-mouth, media buzz, and their own subject
11Hawkins and Mothersbaugh (2010, p.532) cite eight studies spanning 50 years, two product cat-
egories, four services, and two countries that show remarkable consistency in terms of the limited
amount of external information search that consumers perform.
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matter expertise. In such instances the consumer does not actively seek product in-
formation but may nonetheless acquire it through his usual day-to-day actions. We
assume that such information does not arise or is of trivial importance. This assump-
tion is clearly more reasonable for some products than others: while the introduction
of Apple Inc.s iPhone 5 was met with wide public chatter and media anticipation,
Colgates latest iteration of toothpaste with a burst of freshnessdid not garner such
a response.
For all the reasons given here we assume that consumers are initially unwilling or
unable to determine the increase in value of a new product. Over time, consumers
learn the level of quality through various sources including their personal consumption
experience.
1.4 New product development
The censoring decision the rm makes in our model is a common one within any rm
that undertakes R&D e¤ort to develop or improve a product. However, because these
decisions occur internal to the rm they are often obscured from external observa-
tion. To get an estimate of how many failures are culled within the rm, Stevens and
Burley (1997) collected data on patent activity, project activity in large companies,
venture capitalist activity, and independent inventor activity. They divide the product
development process into seven stages:
[I]t takes about 3,000 raw ideas (Stage 1) to come up with 300 ideas on
which the idea generator is willing to take minimal action, such as perform-
ing a few simple experiments, ling a patent disclosure or discussing them
with management (Stage 2)....Approximately 125 of the 300 ideas in Stage
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2 advance to Stage 3 to become a small project, usually having a high prob-
ability of receiving a patent (if applicable). Approximately nine projects
survive to Stage 4 and develop into signicant projects (large development
e¤orts). Four of these advance to Stage 5 to become major development ef-
forts. Of the four major developments, approximately 1.7 are commercially
launched (Stage 6). Of 1.7 projects commercially launched, on average only
one (59 percent) is typically commercially successful (Stage 7).
As these data demonstrate, rms frequently censor ideas or products they ulti-
mately determine will not be commercial successes. Such endogenous censoring is a
key component of our model and serves as the basis from which consumers form their
beliefs about a new product versions quality. Note we assume rms know the value
of their product improvement so that the costly decision to introduce a new version
may signal quality. For modeling simplicity we assume the rm perfectly observes the
value of its improvement, thus abstracting from the uncertainty rms often have over
the demand they face (Stage 7).
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains our assumptions and
introduces our base model in which consumers perfectly learn from their consumption
experience. In Section 3 we establish the existence of equilibria while in Section 4 we
discuss welfare results. In Section 5 we allow for an ex-ante investment stage in which
the rm can inuence its distribution of R&D outcomes. Section 6 extends the model
to the case of imperfect, noisyconsumer learning about product quality. We then
conclude and discuss areas for future research.
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2 Model
Consumers indexed by i have unit demand for a monopolists product in each of two
periods and i.i.d. heterogeneous valuations vi with continuous density g and distribu-
tion function G with full support on some interval [0; v] for v 2 (0;1]. The rm has no
marginal or xed costs of production but can add an attribute or otherwise modify its
product for a one-time xed cost of M (and no additional marginal cost) by accepting
the realization a of its research and development random variable A. Hence the rms
innovation signal is binary: either it sells a new version or not. A is continuous with
full support12 on (a; a)  R and has exogenous density f and distribution F which is
log-concave. Both f and g are common knowledge. In a subsequent section we endog-
enize the distribution of A by allowing the rm to choose R&D e¤ort level. We assume
a is high enough that such a type will always add its attribute and that a   v. As
will be made clear in our formulation of the consumers utility function, this latter
condition allows for the possibility of a harmful R&D outcome.13
The exogenous investment costM can be thought of as the cost to alter production
facilities or product rollout costs such as marketing expenditures; we assume it is
independent of the realization of A. Potential consumers know the distribution of A
but not its realization, and there is no credible direct way the rm can provide this
information. For simplicity we assume A is a common value attribute and rst period
12It su¢ ces to have Pr[A > 0] > 0 and Pr[A < 0] > 0 to establish the propositions that follow. In
particular, a mass point at 0 can be accommodated.
13In reality we infrequently observe outcomes a < 0 because they do not survive the rms internal
censoring rule. This is one interpretation of Stevens and Burleys (1997) ndings that the vast majority
of R&D projects are ultimately abandoned. Requiring further that a   v simplies the presentation
of the results.
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consumers buy if and only if
E[Ui] = vi + E[A]  p  0, (1)
where p is the price charged and E[A] is consumersexpectation of A given their beliefs
. Thus the addition of an attribute does not change the dispersion of the distribution
of consumersvaluations and so results in a shift in demand.14 We initially assume all
consumers learn the realization of A at the end of the rst period, through either their
own perfectly informative consumption experience, word-of-mouth communications, or
product review websites.15 ;16 Therefore second period consumers are fully informed and
buy if and only if
Ui = vi + a  p(a)  0. (2)
As an extension in Section 6 we specify learning from consumption as an imperfect,
noisy process in which second period consumers Bayesian update their beliefs after
observing the sum a+ , where  is a mean zero error term.
Utility maximization gives rise to the function q(E[A]; p) = 1 G(p E[A]), which
represents the proportion of consumers that buy each period at price p given their
posterior expectation E[A]. Note that rst period consumers know their valuation of
an unmodied product and in this case we use a = 0 in the equations above. Thus all
consumers begin the game informed and become uninformed only if the rm introduces
14Hence we do not analyze rotations in demand (Johnson and Myatt, 2006).
15Thus there is no role for strategic buying to acquire information. See Grossman, Kihlstrom and
Mirman (1977) for treatment of this subject.
16Just as price and advertising may signal quality in a one-period setting in which some consumers
are informed (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Linnemer, 2002), so too can the innovation signal, as shown
in the Appendix in which the role of second period informed consumers is replaced with a proportion
of rst period consumers informed of the rms R&D outcome. The current model allows innovation
signaling to be analyzed separately from price signaling.
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a new version of its product. This feature of the model di¤ers frommany other signaling
games and simplies its structure. We also initially assume the rm must commit to
selling the same (old or new) product in both periods, but later allow for the rm to
sell a new and improvedproduct in period 1 and revert to its old product in period
2 at a xed cost of R  0.
Our equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium subject to a restriction
on o¤-the-equilibrium-path beliefs explained below. In general consumers can form
beliefs about the rms type given its decision to sell a new or old product and its
price. However, by construction in our case there is no means by which price can
serve as a signal: there are no cost di¤erences across types nor do benets vary by the
assumption that all consumers learn each rms type at the end of the rst period.17
We can therefore reasonably expect consumer beliefs to be invariant to price and thus
assume that o¤ the equilibrium path consumers do not update their beliefs about rm
type based on price.
3 Results
We show that a rms binary decision to implement an R&D outcome or not involves a
simple trade-o¤ between inducing a new productpremium in the rst period by pay-
ing up-front modication costs M and selling to consumers who will be fully informed
of the products value in the second period. For a low enough type a, the modication
costs and potential decline in second period prots exceed the benets conferred by
17As discussed in Banks and Sobel (1987), without such type-dependent payo¤ di¤erences standard
forward-induction renements do not apply. In Milgrom and Roberts (1986) price (and advertising)
may signal exogenously determined product quality because of their requirement that consumers
purchase the product in order to learn its type.
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the new product premium and thus the rm censors its R&D outcome. Though un-
informed, rst period consumers place a demand premium on new products because
they know the rm needs to earn prots from informed consumers in period 2 in order
to recoup the modication cost M .
When consumers have expectation E[A], let (E[A]) = maxp fp  q(E[A]; p)g
and pE[A] = argmaxp (E[A]) be the maximum prots attainable and the prot
maximizing price, respectively, and let  be the discount factor between periods. The
following proposition shows that a unique partially separating equilibrium exists if
(E[A]) M  (1 + ) (0), (3)
while a unique pooling equilibrium exists otherwise. Intuitively, equation 3 says that
the rm prefers consumers buy its old product in both periods over selling only in
period 1 to consumers with beliefs equal to the unconditional mean of A. That is, in
order for a partially separating equilibrium to exist low enough types must be deterred
from selling a new product by the prospect of losing su¢ cient sales in the second period.
Proposition 1 In the unique equilibrium there exists a threshold c such that the rm
modies its product whenever a > c and otherwise does not. In period 1 all new
and improved types charge the same high price pH = pE[AjA>c] while all unmodied
types charge the low price pL = p0. In period 2 each type charges its full information
monopoly price. When condition 3 holds the equilibrium is partially separating and
otherwise c = a so that all types sell a new product.
Proof The rm uses a threshold strategy because higher types always have more incen-
tive to sell a new version for any given beliefs. For the same reason an equilibrium in-
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volving mixed strategies cannot exist. Consider a candidate equilibrium in which there
is a threshold type-c rm which should be indi¤erent to selling a new version or not. By
backwards induction it receives a discounted payo¤ of  (c) in period 2. In period 1
any modifying type will price pool on pH = pE[AjA>c] provided o¤-the-equilibrium-path
beliefs following an unexpected price are not greater than E [A j A > c], a condition
satised because prices do not a¤ect beliefs.
Let the gains and losses to the threshold type-c rm from modifying its product
be G(c) and L(c), respectively. A gain is derived from rst period consumers who are
uninformed and is the increase in payo¤s from selling the new version instead of the
old: G(c) = (E [A j A > c])   (0). The loss is the cost M to modify the product
plus the discounted decline in prots, if any, from second period informed consumers:
L(c) =M +  [(0)  (c)].
Note that G is continuous and monotonically increasing in c while L is continuous
and monotonically decreasing in c. By the assumption that a is high enough that type
a = a will always modify its product, we conclude that G(c) > L(c) for high enough
c and thus G(c) and L(c) either cross at a unique point or not at all. Equation 3 is
the necessary and su¢ cient condition for a unique crossing and is derived by setting
G(c) < L(c) in the limit as c! a.
See Figure 1 for a visual depiction of the proof. Reading from right to left, as
c decreases the G curve decreases and the L curve increases towards their respective
asymptotes. As pictured, if the L asymptote exceeds the G asymptote (i.e., if condition
3 is satised) then the two curves have a unique intersection at the equilibrium value c.
Otherwise there is a pooling equilibrium in which all rm types adopt the innovation.
Note that o¤-the-equilibrium-path beliefs with respect to the product launch decision
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Figure 1: A visual depiction of the proof to Proposition 1
either do not exist or are trivial. With partial separation both possible actions occur
in equilibrium and so no action is o¤ the equilibrium path. In a pooling equilibrium
a defector does not modify and so the product remains in its old form, the quality of
which consumers already know.18 O¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs are invariant with
respect to price, as discussed in footnote 17.
Proposition 1 characterizes the use of the innovation signal in equilibrium while its
proof makes clear the following remark.
Remark 1 In equilibrium E [A j A > c] > 0. That is, new products are on average
improved.
We therefore conclude there will be a new product demand and pricing premium
in the rst period. This together with the fact that uninformed consumers always
have a more favorable belief about the threshold type than do informeds, implies the
attribute adoption threshold c must be less than the threshold bc that prevails when
18One may also hypothesize a no new productsequilibrium in which any new product is believed
to be the lowest type (E[A] = a) by rst period consumers. However, such an equilibriumfails by
our assumption that the highest type a is high enough it will always modify its product, i.e., a is such
that   (a) M > (1 + )  (0).
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consumers are fully informed in both periods. Thus types a 2 (c;bc) exploit uninformed
consumersbeliefs about new products by making a product improvement that would
otherwise be unprotable had all consumers been informed. We explore the welfare
e¤ects of such signaling in Section 4.
The extra incentive for types to incur investment cost M provided by rst period
uninformed consumers has implications for rm use of trivial and harmful product
modications. Here we dene a product modication as trivial if the new product
price premium exceeds the value a of the new attribute. Note that while our denition
involves a trade-o¤between attribute value and price, the marketing literature generally
denes a trivial attribute purely in terms of its value without consideration of price
(e.g., Carpenter, Glazer, and Nakamoto, 1994).
Denition 1 The attribute a is trivial if p  pH   pL  a  0 and useful if a > p.
Remark 2 The signaling power of a new product may be so strong that the rm will
add a trivial attribute.
Remark 1 implies the new product price premium p is strictly positive so that any
type a 2 [0;p] that modies is trivial. Consider an example where A  U [ 0:5; 0:5],
M = 1
20
,  = 9
10
and q = 1   p + E[A]. This implies c   0:125 and p  0:094 so
that a 2 [0; 0:094] are trivial attributes while a > 0:094 are useful. Note that marginal
consumers who purchase a new product containing a trivial attribute will ex-post regret
doing so because equation (2) will be violated. Pushing these concepts further leads
us to our next denition and remark.
Denition 2 The attribute a is schlimmbesserung if a < 0.
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Remark 3 The signaling power of a new product may be so strong that the rm will
add a schlimmbesserung attribute.
Thus a rm that adds a schlimmbesserung attribute pays costM to make its prod-
uct worse. Clearly such a tactic will be protable only if rst period uninformed
consumers have a su¢ ciently high posterior over new products. In such cases the rst
period increase in prots must outweigh two costs: rst, the usual product modication
cost M and second, a new cost resulting from a decline in second period prots. Such
a decline occurs when consumers are informed that a < 0 so that prots (a) are less
than if the rm had sold its old product and earned (0). It may now be clear why
our original formulation of the loss function L(c) in the proof of Proposition 1 included
the decline in prots from second period consumers. With c   0:125, attributes
a 2 [ 0:125; 0) are schlimmbesserung whereas a <  0:125 will be censored by the
rm in equilibrium. Generally, schlimmbesserung attributes will be adopted whenever
G(0) > L(0), or
(E [A j A > 0]) > (0) +M . (4)
Intuitively, the presence of schlimmbesserung attributes requires the prior distrib-
ution of A to be su¢ ciently favorable and modication costs M to be su¢ ciently low.
Notice from condition (4) that the sign of c is not a function of : However, an increase
in  does magnify the e¤ect of the second period on the equilibrium determination of
c. Thus when (4) holds an increase in  increases the potency of the second period
decline in prots and so has the equilibrium result of increasing c towards 0. Con-
versely, when (4) fails an increase in  magnies the second period increase in prots
and therefore reduces c.
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Product reversion
Before analyzing welfare we rst relax the assumption that the product cannot
be unmodiedin period 2. This may occur due to a contracting environment that
requires the rm sell the same product in both periods, uneconomically large xed
reversion costs, or a lag in the publicly observable production process so that a decision
to revert in period 2 must be initiated in period 1. Nonetheless, there are many
plausible scenarios where reverting may be possible. Assume the rm can revert to its
old product in period 2 for a xed cost of R  0 that does not depend on A.
It is clear that the ability to revert to the unmodied product in period 2 will only
be exercised by a rm that has adopted a schlimmbesserung attribute, as all other
types a  0 have no incentive to revert when R  0. Knowing this, consumers ought
to have revised their beliefs in period 1 about the expected quality of a new and
improvedproduct. Recall that a new type a < 0 rm forgoes prots of (0) (a) in
the second period. However, having the ability to revert caps at R this cost and thus
when (0)   (a)  R the rm will pay R to revert to its old product and otherwise
will keep its product as new and improvedand su¤er the resulting loss in period 2
prots. In essence, the type a 2 [c; 0) rm either accepts its market punishment in
period 2 or pays a fee of R to avoid this punishment. For notational convenience we
dene the highest reverting type ar as solving
(0)  (ar) = R (5)
and we note that ar < 0. By allowing product reversion the loss incurred from mod-
ifying a product becomes L(c) = M +  minfR; (0)   (c)g, which is continuous in
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c and non-decreasing as c decreases. This leads to substantially the same ndings as
before but with a new partially separating condition.
Proposition 2 Let there be a xed reversion cost R  0, independent of A. Then
Proposition 1 holds and no types revert when c  0. If c < ar then types a 2 [c; ar]
revert in the second period. The separating condition becomes:
(E(A)) M   minf(0); Rg+ (0) (6)
Proof The proof of Proposition 1 applies with the minor modication that L(c) =
M +  minfR; (0)  (c)g. Types a 2 [c; ar] revert by the discussion above.
Allowing reversion to the old product does not qualitatively change the results of
the model, though pooling is easier to sustain because of the ceiling on the cost the rm
incurs from selling a schlimmbesserung product. If the ceiling binds, it induces more
types to modify in period 1 and thus implies a weaker new product signal. In Figure
2 imposing a ceiling drops the equilibrium threshold value from c to c0 and therefore
implies E(A j A > c) > E(A j A > c0).
Remark 4 The equilibrium threshold c is weakly increasing in reversion cost R.
When some types revert lowering R implies a weaker new product signal and a higher
probability of a schlimmbesserung attribute.
Finally, note that a new product fails to provide a positive signal only when both
the introduction and retraction of an attribute are costless; i.e., M = R = 0. In this
case E(A j A > c) = 0 so that being perceived as new no longer confers any demand
premium and thus pH = pL.
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Figure 2: Costly product reversion when M = 0 and R > 0.
In the next section we consider the welfare e¤ects of trivial and schlimmbesserung
attributes and will have use of the following denition: the type threshold a social
planner would employ when weighing the welfare e¤ects of a new product against the
initial investment M required to adopt a new attribute.
Denition 3 Let c be the adoption threshold that maximizes ex-ante welfare. We
dene attributes a < c as ine¢ cient and a  c as e¢ cient.
Thus we contemplate a social planner committing the rm to an adoption threshold,
conditional on uninformed consumersinferences and the rms pricing decisions in our
two-period model. As we will show, this threshold that maximizes the sum of ex-ante
prots and consumer surplus could be higher or lower than the rms threshold c. In
the present example c = 0:047, so attributes a 2 ( 0:125; 0:047) are ine¢ cient and
will be added. Notice there may exist attributes that are both e¢ cient and trivial, as
discussed later.
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Figure 3: Existence ranges for A  U [ 0:5; 0:5], M = 1
20
,  = 9
10
and q = 1  p+E[A].
Table 1 below summarizes the denitions from this section and indicates when
useful, trivial, or schlimmbesserung attributes might exist. Figure 3 illustrates the
existence ranges for these attribute types for the example under consideration. In the
example c < p < bc though this need not hold in general.
Table 1: Denitions
Symbol Meaning Notes
c Adoption threshold If c < 0, schlimmbesserung occurs
bc Full information adoption threshold c < bc
c Social planners adoption threshold c < bc , c Q c
p New product price premium a 2 [0;p] are trivial, a > p useful
4 Welfare
We have found that the incentive to signal a new and improvedproduct leads rms
to adopt new attributes that in a full information environment do not justify the
rms modication costs, and that may be trivial or even schlimmbesserung. Given
this result it might seem welfare must be lower than if consumers could immediately
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learn the exact quality of a new attribute. However, even with full information the
rms adoption decision is already ine¢ cient. As Arrow (1959) showed, a rm does
not consider the gains to consumer surplus from adopting an innovation so it will tend
to underinvest, which in our context corresponds to not adopting an innovation if the
prot gain is less thanM even if the total gain in prots and consumer surplus is higher
than M . Given this problem, the signaling incentive to adopt a new innovation and
receive a demand and pricing premium from uninformed consumers might on average
lead to higher rather than lower e¢ ciency.19
To see how the signaling e¤ect can mitigate or even reverse the Arrow underinvest-
ment problem, rst consider the monopolists adoption decision when consumers are
fully informed in both periods. The type-a monopolist modies its product whenever
its increase in prots, as seen in regions B, C and D in the left panel of Figure 4, exceed
modication costs M . Recall the type bc rm is indi¤erent to adoption whereas types
a > bc strictly prefer to adopt the attribute. In contrast, a social planner that takes
monopoly pricing to fully informed consumers as given is indi¤erent to adoption when
the increase in total surplus from selling the new product, as seen in regions E, D and
C in the left panel of Figure 4, equals M . Because the social planner has regard for
consumer surplus his threshold must be less than the monopolists and the planner
strictly prefers adoption for the type bc rm.
The same incentives underlying the monopoly underinvestment problem arise in our
model with asymmetric information but they are counteracted by the incentive to signal
to rst period uninformed consumers. First consider the equilibrium determination of
19This second-best problem can readily arise with signaling games. For instance, if education has
positive externalities then the signaling incentive to overeducate can raise rather than lower total
welfare.
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the investment threshold c and hypothesize c = bc. But then the type bc rm must
strictly prefer investment because of the demand premium it receives from rst period
consumers who infer quality E [A j A > bc] and so buy more of the new product at a
higher price than they would if informed. The resulting higher prots imply we must
instead have c < bc. The right panel of Figure 4 displays this argument graphically by
drawing the informed demand curve for a new product of type bc. Additional purchases
by uninformed consumers reduce the deadweight loss of monopoly in region F1, whereas
the price premium consumers pay results in a transfer of regions E2 and T to the rm.
Therefore the type bc rm must strictly prefer adoption of the new attribute.
The determination of the social planners preferred threshold is more complicated
because it involves ex-ante consideration of a types investment on the new product
demand premium enjoyed by all other modifying types. Thus, in the right panel of
Figure 4 although the type bc rm facing uninformed rst period consumers prefers
investment in part due to the reduction in deadweight loss F1, it does not consider this
investments e¤ects on higher types that might have been realized. In fact, a lower
type investing implies a weaker new product signal and therefore a lower demand
premium for all other modifying types. The planner, on the other hand, considers such
externalities because he prefers a threshold that maximizes ex-ante welfare (conditional,
we are supposing, on monopoly pricing and imperfect information). This fact, together
with the planners indi¤erence to transfers E2+T but regard for consumer surplus E1,
implies we cannot make any general comparison of the planners threshold to the rms.
What then can we conclude about welfare? When the new product premium derived
from uninformed consumers is high relative to the cost of sending the new product
signal, i.e., the distribution of A is su¢ ciently favorable relative to M , overinvestment
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can result. This can be seen in the example in Figure 3 where the incentive to signal is
so strong that even schlimmbesserung attributes are adopted. However, with a weaker
incentive to signal the net gain can be positive as seen in Example 1 below. In this
case trivial attributes are sometimes adopted by the rm, but the loss to consumers
from such attributes is a transfer to the rm and overall expected welfare rises as the
underinvestment problem is mitigated.
Example 1 We take the example presented in Figure 3 and change it by increasing
M and allowing costly reversion. Specically, let q = 1   p + E [A], A  U  1
2
; 1
2

,
M = 1
4
,  = 9
10
, and R = 1
20
. Then in period 1 all types greater than c  0:136 modify
their products and charge a price pH  0:659 and types a 2 [c;p)  [0:136; 0:159)
are trivial. No types revert to their old product and each type charges its own full
information monopoly price in period 2. Notwithstanding the addition of some trivial
types the monopoly underinvestment problem is mitigated as total expected welfare is
higher under imperfect information (0:814) than full information (0:812).
The preceding examples lead us to the following proposition. Loosely speaking,
welfare is higher when consumers are initially uninformed if the new product signaling
e¤ect does not go too far in solving Arrows underinvestment problem by encourag-
ing the excessive introduction of new versions, as would happen if, for example, new
versions were free to introduce (M = 0).
Proposition 3 Total expected welfare is higher when consumers are initially unin-
formed of product quality than when they are fully informed if and only if the adoption
cost is su¢ ciently high.
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Figure 4: The signaling e¤ect induces marginal types below bc to invest and decreases
deadweight loss by region F1. Note: E = E1 + E2 and F = F1 + F2.
Proof Consider the equilibrium thresholds bc and c as a function of the adoption cost
M . The equilibrium condition that the threshold type is indi¤erent to introducing a
new version implies
(1 + ) (bc) = (1 + ) (0) +M =  (E [A j A > c]) +  (c).
By the fact that c < bc we must also have c < bc < E [A j A > c]. In addition, each of
these terms is increasing in M . Finally, the log-concavity of f implies E [A j A > c] 
c is decreasing in c (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005), and thus in M , so that the
di¤erence between the thresholds bc and c decreases inM . Since the planners threshold
c contemplates consumer surplus, @c
@M
< @bc
@M
so that the di¤erence between bc and c
increases in M , and thus c < c < bc for su¢ ciently high M .
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Finally, the right panel of Figure 4 can help resolve a seeming oddity that rst
appeared in Figure 3: the existence of types that are both e¢ cient and trivial. Let the
informed demand curve for a type a 2 [c;p] be given in the right panel of 4. Then
marginal purchasing consumers make transfer payment T to the rm and therefore ex-
post regret buying such a product because of the trivial attribute. Nonetheless, because
the type is e¢ cient the increased output and resulting reduction in deadweight loss F1
increase expected welfare.
Since the rm may sell a product with an ine¢ cient improvement, including even
a degraded product, the question naturally arises as to whether it would prefer com-
mitting not to sell such products.
Proposition 4 The rms expected prots are higher when it commits to using the full
information threshold bc than without commitment.
Proof First note that by construction more favorable beliefs about a results in a
vertical shift in demand, thereby resulting in a higher price charged and quantity sold.
Thus revenues  (a) are convex in a. Now let t = FA(bc) FA(c)
1 FA(c) and 1  t =
1 FA(bc)
1 FA(c) and
recall that c < bc. We restrict ourselves to a > c for otherwise types never add an
attribute. Additionally, when a > bc second period prots are invariant to commitment
and so it su¢ ces to show
t (0) + (1  t) [(E [A j A > bc]) M ] +  t (0) + R1bc (a) fA(a)da
1  FA(c)

> (E [A j A > c]) M + 
R1
c (a) fA(a)da
1  FA(c) . (7)
Below we use the substitution (1 + ) (bc) = (1 + ) (0) +M . Condition (7) holds if
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and only if (E [A j A > c]) is less than
(1  t) (E [A j A > bc]) + t [(1 + ) (0) +M ]
 
R bc
c (a) fA(a)da
1  FA(c)
= (1  t) (E [A j A > bc]) + t (bc)
+
"
t(bc)  R bcc (a)fA(a)da
1  FA(c)
#
. (8)
It thus su¢ ces to show
(1  t) (E [A j A > bc]) + t (bc) > (E [A j A > c]). (9)
By the weak convexity of , the left hand side of (9) is
  (t bc+ (1  t) E [A j A > bc])
= 
 R bc
c bc fA(a)da+ R1bc a fA(a)daR1
c fA(a)da
!
> 
R1
c a fA(a)daR1
c fA(a)da

=  (E [A j A > c]) , (10)
where the nal inequality holds because the non-committing rm sometimes sells a
product with an attribute a < bc.
Proposition 5 The rms expected prots are higher when consumers are fully in-
formed than when they are initially uninformed.
Proof The proof is similar to that above. Without loss of generality we let M = 0
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and  = 1 (see line 7 above and the equilibrium substitution used below it). Let FI
and II be the rst period payo¤s under full and imperfect information, respectively.
We may condition on a  c since lower realizations imply (0) in either case.
FI =
R 0
c
(0) f(a)da+
R a
0
(a) f(a)da
1  F (c)
>
R a
c
(a) f(a)da
1  F (c) (11)
> 
 R a
c
a f(a)da
1  F (c)
!
= II (12)
where the last line follows from the convexity of  and Jensens inequality. Second
period prots are higher under full information when a 2 (c; 0) (since (0) > (a))
and are equal otherwise.
These two propositions demonstrate the net e¤ect of new product signaling on the
rms prots. When facing imperfectly informed consumers, the rm is tempted by
the immediate gains from accepting an R&D outcome that would otherwise be unprof-
itable had consumers been informed. However, the modest benet accrued from doing
so does not last since consumers eventually learn the products quality. In addition,
such marginal types impose a negative externality on higher types: real and signif-
icant improvements made to the product are not initially rewarded enough because
consumers anticipate that the rm will occasionally introduce trivial or ine¢ cient new
products. The net e¤ect is the rms ex-ante prots are higher if it either it could com-
mit not to introduce such marginal products or if consumers were initially informed.
For this reason a rm has incentive to educate its customers about a new products
features if such communication would be deemed credible.
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5 Extension: ex-ante investment
We now extend the model by allowing the rm to choose its R&D e¤ort level which
in turn implies a distribution of R&D outcomes. If, loosely speaking, greater e¤ort
induces a betterdistribution of outcomes, how much e¤ort will the rm exert? Does
the answer to this question change if consumers are fully informed instead of imper-
fectly informed? That is, although expected prots are higher under full than imperfect
information, which grow faster with e¤ort and therefore would induce a higher equi-
librium e¤ort level?
Formally, we add a stage to the beginning of the game in which the rm chooses
e¤ort level e 2 [0;1) which incurs a cost C (e) with C 0 > 0, C 00 > 0 and C (0) = 0.
It is assumed that e¤ort level e is publicly observable and maps into distributions of
R&D outcomes in a known way20; here we specify that e¤ort e induces distribution
A (e)  A+e, where A is the distribution when no e¤ort is exerted. Thus e¤ort induces
a better distribution in the sense of statewise dominance, a stronger condition than
rst-order stochastic dominance.21 The rest of the game then proceeds as usual. Thus
the rm chooses an e¤ort level which induces the subgame that is described in Section
2. The rms problem then is to choose e so that prots in the subgame net of the cost
of e¤ort is maximal.
In this section we examine investment in an ex-ante sense, whereby greater R&D
20The public observability of R&D e¤ort levels is reasonable for rms that are publically traded
or issue publically traded debt and thus publish nancial statements that would document such
expenditures. That e¤ort maps into a known distribution of outcomes requires consumers to know
how the capabilities of the rm interact with the inherent randomness of the R&D process.
21The rst-order stochastic dominance of one random variable over another is not su¢ cient to ensure
a change in the equilibrium threshold. This is true generally of options, where an improvement to the
states for which the option would not be exercised confers no additional value on the option. Since it
is natural to suppose the rms behavior is continuous in its e¤ort, we make the stronger assumption
of statewise dominance.
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e¤ort induces a better distribution of outcomes. In contrast, in the previous section
we discussed ex-post investment in which the rm decided to accept a realized R&D
outcome or not at some cost. Without loss of generality, we henceforth assume M = 0
and  = 1.
5.1 Preliminaries
In this subsection we explore the equilibrium e¤ect of e¤ort on the subgame and estab-
lish results that lead to the main proposition of this section. When necessary, we denote
by c (e) the equilibrium threshold induced by A (e), which has support on [a+ e; a+ e].
Lemma 1 (i). Under imperfect information, a better distribution of outcomes induces
a lower equilibrium threshold c but a higher new product signal.
(ii). Under full information, the equilibrium threshold bc is invariant to the distrib-
ution of R&D outcomes.
(iii). Under both full and imperfect information, the rm derives a benet from a
better distribution of R&D outcomes.
Proof (i). Of immediate concern is e¤ort e inducing a better distribution. We proceed
in the proof by considering the e¤ects of a chosen e on the subgame that follows (i.e., the
determination of c or bc), where C (e) is sunk. Restating the lemma more formally, if
e2 > e1 then c (e2) < c (e1) but E [A (e2) j A (e2) > c (e2)] > E [A (e1) j A (e1) > c (e1)].
For any xed c, E [A j A > c] is greater when A(e2) is the relevant random variable
than when A (e1) is. This follows because if the type c (e1) is indi¤erent to selling a new
product version when A (e1) is the distribution of R&D outcomes, then this same type
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must strictly prefer to sell a new version when A(e2) is the relevant random variable,
and thus we must have c (e2) < c (e1).
We now argue that E [A (e2) j A (e2) > c (e2)] > E [A (e1) j A (e1) > c (e1)]. Sup-
pose instead they are equal. But then the type c (e2) cannot be indi¤erent when
A (e2) is the R&D distribution as the rst period payo¤s match that when c (e1) and
A (e1) are used but the second period payo¤s must be lower since c (e2) < c (e1).
Since c (e1) is indi¤erent given A (e1), we deduce type c (e2) strictly prefers not to be-
come new and improved given A (e2). Thus the true equilibrium value c (e2) must
be greater than this conjectured value of c (e2) and thus E [A (e2) j A (e2) > c (e2)] >
E [A (e1) j A (e1) > c (e1)].
(ii). Inferences about the new products quality, which are a¤ected by the distribu-
tion of outcomes, are no longer needed since consumers directly observe the realization
of the R&D process. Thus the determination of the indi¤erent type bc depends only on
the payo¤ conditional on being this type; i.e., A(e) appears nowhere in the equilibrium
condition 2 (bc) M = 2 (0).
(iii). The proof is obvious for the case of full information. For the case of imper-
fect information, again consider arbitrary e2 > e1. We claim the prots expected under
A (e2) exceed that under A (e1), where C (e) is ignored. First, note that under A (e2) all
types a  c (e1) are better o¤sinceE [A (e2) j A (e2) > c (e2)] > E [A (e1) j A (e1) > c (e1)].
Next, types a 2 (c (e2) ; c (e1)) (those types that sell a new product under A (e2) but
not under A (e1)) receive a higher payo¤ than type c (e2), who itself is indi¤erent to
selling a new product. Thus these types earn a higher payo¤ under A (e2) than when
they sell the old product under A (e1). Types a  c (e2) are indi¤erent between A (e1)
and A (e2) because in either case they sell their old product version.
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Lemma 2 Let A  [a; a], 0 > 0, 00 > 0. Dene Jensens di¤erence as E [ (A)]  
 (E [A]) and A (e) = A+ e. Then Jensens di¤erence
(i) increases in e if 000 > 0.
(ii) decreases in e if 000 < 0.
(iii) is constant in e, decreases in a, and increases in a if 000 = 0.
Proof We rst prove the statements regarding e:
@
@e
Z a
a
 (a+ e) f(a)da

  @
@e


Z a
a
(a+ e) f(a)da

=
Z a
a
0 (a+ e) f(a)da  0
Z a
a
(a+ e) f(a)da

which is just Jensens di¤erence for 0. Thus by Jensens inequality the line above is
positive when 0 is convex, negative when 0 is concave, and constant when 0 is both;
i.e., 000 > 0, 000 < 0, and 000 = 0 respectively.
To prove the statement in (iii) regarding endpoints a and a, we note that 000 = 0
implies  is a polynomial of the form (a) = k1a2 + k2a + k3 where ki are positive
constants by our assumptions on 0 and 00. We now claim that Jensens di¤erence is
proportional to the variance of A:
Z  
k1a
2 + k2a+ k3

f(a)da   k1E [A]2 + k2E [A] + k3
= k1
Z
a2f(a)da+ k2
Z
af(a)da+ k3   k1E [A]2   k2E [A]  k3
= k1
 
E

A2
  E [A]2
= k1V ar [A]
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Since it is well known that truncation reduces the variance compared with the
variance in the untruncated distribution (Greene, 2008), V ar [A] and thus Jensens
di¤erence increases in a and decreases in a.
5.2 Marginal benet from R&D e¤ort
We are ultimately interested in understanding the ex-ante investment decision of the
rm facing imperfectly informed (II) customers, and for this purpose we employ
two benchmark cases: that of a rm facing fully informed (FI) consumers and a
social planner (SP). We dene MBji be the expected marginal benet from ex-ante
investment to j derived in period i, where j = FI; II; or SP and MBj = MBj1 +
MBj2. In many cases determining who invests mores reverts to comparing this term for
di¤erent j. To begin with, we compare the investment incentives of a social planner to
a rm in a full information setting and nd a result analogous to that found previously
regarding ex-post investment. Specically, MBSPi > MB
FI
i and thus
Remark 5 Arrows underinvestment problem also exists in the ex-ante sense.
The result is not surprising and derives from the fact that a social planner places
weight on consumer surplus in addition to rmsprots so thatMBSPi > MB
FI
i . This
together with the fact that the social cost equals the private cost of R&D e¤ort implies
the planner would choose a higher ex-ante investment level than the rm.
Given the ex-ante underinvestment problem, we now proceed to determine whether
the informational asymmetry of our game exacerbates or mitigates this phenomenon.
In general this will depend on the curvature of  and f(a) as well as [a; a], the support of
A. We examine several cases to develop the intuition of the general tradeo¤s involved.
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First, we suppose the distribution of R&D outcomes is favorable enough that bad
outcomes never occur.
Lemma 3 Suppose a  0. Then the marginal benet from ex-ante investment under
full information is:
(i) higher than the MB under imperfect information when 000 > 0
(ii) lower than the MB under imperfect information when 000 < 0
(iii) equal to the MB under imperfect information when 000 = 0
Proof Since a < 0 is not possible the payo¤s to the FI and II rm are identical
in the second period and it su¢ ces to consider only the rst. MBFI1 > MB
II
1 ()
@
@e
E [ (A)]  @
@e
 (E [A]) is increasing in e; that is, if Jensens di¤erence increases in e.
The inequality is reversed when the di¤erence decreases in e, and it becomes equality
when the di¤erence is constant in e. The results now follow from Lemma 2.
Thus when only positive realization are possible, the curvature of the prot function
alone determines whether FI or II enjoys a higher MB from ex-ante investment and
the distribution of outcomes is not relevant.
Remark 6 The lemma above holds as well if we exogenously forbid schlimmbesserung
from occurring.
We now suppose negative realizations can occur and that a pooling equilibrium
exists in the subgame. The results are somewhat weaker in that the curvature of f(a)
becomes relevant in some instances.
Lemma 4 Suppose a < 0 and a pooling equilibrium exists. Then the marginal benet
from ex-ante investment under full information is:
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(i) ambiguous with respect to the MB under imperfect information when 000 > 0
(ii) lower than the MB under imperfect information when 000  0
Proof (ii). First, note MBII2 > MB
FI
2 since investment only improves the rms
payo¤ if the R&D realization if it is adopted. In a pooling equilibrium with e e¤ort,
the type-a FI rms second period payo¤ is  (maxf0; a+ eg) while for the II rm it
is  (a+ e). Thus II rm derives a benet from e¤ort for all realizations while the FI
derives no benet from those realizations it will ultimately reject.
It now su¢ ces to show MBII1 MBII2 when 000  0, since then MBII1 MBII2 >
MBFI2 =MB
FI
1 . Let TB
j
i be the total benet, dened analogously to MB
j
i . Thus is
su¢ ces to show TBII1  TBII2 =  
R
 (a) f(a)da    R af(a)da is weakly increasing
in e¤ort. The result holds when 000  0 by Lemma 2.
(i). By example. Let A + e  U  1
2
+ e; 3
2
+ e

and suppose (a) =
 
a+ 1
2
n
for
n  1. Note that this function is non-negative and increasing for a   1
2
, as required
and when e 2 0; 1
2

there is a pooling equilibrium in the subgame.22 Prots (ignoring
the cost of e¤ort) under full information are
 
    1
2
+ e

2
 (0) +
Z 3
2
+e
0
 (a)
2
da
!
 2
=

1
2
  e

1
2
n
+
Z 3
2
+e
0

a+
1
2
n
da
22We require e  12 so that negative realizations can occur. Pooling occurs because when e = 0 we
have  (E [A]) +  (a) > 2 (0), which becomes 
 
1
2

+ 
   12 > 2 (0) and the inequality holds for
all n > 1 since the left hand side equals 1 always while the right hand side is 2
 
1
2
n
=
 
1
2
n 1  1 for
n  1. Pooling must also then occur for e > 0.
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while the marginal benet from e¤ort is
MBFI =
@FI
@e
= (2 + e)n   2 n (13)
Under imperfect information prots are
1 

1
2
+ e

+
Z 3
2
+e
  1
2
+e
 (a)
2
da
=

1
2
+ e+
1
2
n
+
Z 3
2
+e
  1
2
+e
 
a+ 1
2
n
2
da
and thus the marginal benet from e¤ort is
MBII =
@II
@e
= n (e+ 1)n 1 +
1
2
((2 + e)n   en) (14)
The example is consistent with the results in Lemma 4(ii) when 1  n  2 and
establishes the ambiguity asserted in part (i). For example, suppose n = 3. Then
000 > 0 and it can be shown from lines 13 and 14 thatMBFI > MBII for all e 2 0; 1
2

.
Suppose instead n = 2:1. Then 000 > 0 again, but now lines 13 and 14 imply there
exists (e.g., e = 1
2
) an e 2 0; 1
2

such that MBII > MBFI so that for this level of e
marginal investment is more valuable to the II rm than the FI rm.
We see from the proof of the lemma that in a pooling equilibrium the II rm always
derives a benet from R&D e¤ort due to the fact that schlimmbesserung is made less
likely. Thus a rm has an additional incentive to invest under II so as to convince
consumers schlimmbesserung is unlikely to occur. Such a motive is absent under FI
since schlimmbesserung will not occur in this context regardless of the distribution of
outcomes.
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This intuition carries over to the nal case we treat, that of a separating equilibrium,
but with a complication. Although statically schlimmbesserung becomes less likely
with greater investment because probability mass is shifted towards more favorable
outcomes, in equilibrium this very fact causes the adoption threshold to fall (Lemma
1(i)) thus allowing for more instances of schlimmbesserung. The net e¤ect of these
forces is largely ambiguous so that more stringent conditions are required to make a
comparison of the full and imperfect information settings.
Lemma 5 Suppose a < 0 and a separating equilibrium exists. Then the marginal
benet from ex-ante investment under full information is:
(i) greater than the MB under imperfect information when 
000
= 0 and f is non-
increasing.
(ii) ambiguous with respect to the MB under imperfect information otherwise.
Proof (i). We establish the result for each period. For the second period, it suf-
ces to show the expected amount by which prot under FI exceeds that under IIR 0
c
((0)  (a)) f (a) da increases in e¤ort. This follows since higher e implies both
a lower equilibrium c and, because f is non-increasing, more weight is given to this
interval.
For the rst period, we make use of the proof of Proposition 5. Fix c at its
equilibrium level when e = 0. Then by Lemma 2(iii) higher e¤ort weakly strengthens
the inequality in line 12 (each side of the inequality grows at the same rate so that
the absolute di¤erence increases). Higher e¤ort actually induces a lower threshold c,
and by Lemma 2(iii) the inequality in line 12 is further strengthened if we allow c to
re-equilibriate. Finally, the inequality in line 11 strengthens by the same argument
that applies to the second period.
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(ii) By example. Let A+ e have an increasing triangular distribution with density
f (a) = a+1 e
2
on [ 1 + e; 1 + e] and suppose (a) = a. Then expected prots under
full information are:
Z 0
 1+e
0

a+ 1  e
2

da+
Z 1+e
0
a

a+ 1  e
2

da

 2
=
Z 1+e
0
a (a+ 1  e) da
where this expression is valid for 0  e  1. Di¤erentiating with respect to e we nd
the marginal benet from R&D e¤ort
2 (1 + e) +
Z 1+e
0
( a) da (15)
Under imperfect information we nd the equilibrium threshold to be
c =
2
5
e+
1
5
p
3
p
3e2   16e+ 8  7
5
where this expression is valid when separation occurs23; that is, when the lowest real-
ization is less than the threshold c:
 1 + e < c = 2
5
e+
1
5
p
3
p
3e2   16e+ 8  7
5
(16)
23We solve:
 (E [AjA > c]) +  (c) = 2 (0)
E [AjA > c] + c = 0R 1+e
c
a
 
a+1 e
2

daR 1+e
c
 
a+1 e
2

da
+ c = 0
a solution to which is c = 25e+
1
5
p
3
p
3e2   16e+ 8  75 . We reject the root 25e  15
p
3
p
3e2   16e+ 8  75 .
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The condition is satised and thus separation occurs for e 2 0; 1
3

, while pooling occurs
when e  1
3
.
Next,  (a) = a implies E [ (A)] =  (E [A]) and thus rst period prots equal
second period prots under imperfect information. We calculate total prots under II
as
2
Z c
 1+e
0

a+ 1  e
2

da+
Z 1+e
c
a

a+ 1  e
2

da

=
Z 1+e
c
a (a+ 1  e) da
Di¤erentiating with respect to e we nd the marginal benet from R&D e¤ort:
2 (1 + e)  c (e) c0 (e) [c (e) + 1  e] +
Z 1+e
c(e)
( a) da (17)
We seek to nd when the expression in line 17 exceeds that in line 15. This occurs if
and only if
 c (e) c0 (e) [c (e) + 1  e] +
Z 0
c(e)
( a) da > 0 (18)
We rst note that
R 0
c(e)
( a) da = c(e)2
2
> 0. Also, c (e) < 0 in any equilibrium24 while
c0 (e) < 0 by Lemma 1(i). Thus c (e) + 1   e  0 would be su¢ cient to establish line
18, but this is exactly the negation of the separating condition in line 16. We proceed
by noting that c (e) + 1   e = 0 when e = 1
3
so that pooling just binds but line 18 is
satised. Since this inequality is strict and left hand side of line 18 is continuous in
e, there exists e < 1
3
in the neighborhood of 1
3
such that line 18 is still satised. That
is, the marginal benet from e¤ort is higher under imperfect than full information for
24Recall we are assuming M = 0.
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such e¤ort levels.25
We now provide some brief intuition for the result just established. In the preceding
exampleMBFI > MBII for e = 0 and in the neighborhood. However, as e is increased
the region of schlimmbesserung increases and so too doesMBII since the mass assigned
to the region will fall. Eventually, this e¤ect wins out and MBII > MBFI . When e
gets su¢ ciently high the adoption threshold will drop to a so that separation no longer
occurs and Lemma 4s result for a pooling equilibrium applies.
This last remark illustrates the importance of the cost function C (e) in determining
which Lemma applies. Trivially, if e = 0 implies a separating equilibrium then Lemma
5 applies if C (e) =1 for all e while Lemma 3 would apply if C (e) = 0 on a su¢ ciently
large interval [0; k]. More generally, the cost of e¤ort function can help to determine
whether ex-ante investment is greater under II or FI, as the next example illustrates.
Example 2 We reexamine the example given in the proof of Lemma 5(ii): let A + e
have an increasing triangular distribution with density f (a) = a+1 e
2
on [ 1 + e; 1 + e]
and suppose (a) = a. By plotting the respective marginal benets from ex-ante in-
vestment, MBFI and MBII , we nd that we cannot make general statements about
which information structure will lead to greater investment without having a specied
25With the help of software we can numerically calculate that line 18 holds for e 2  0:129 43; 13.
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Di¤erence in prots between the full and imperfect information rm as a function of e¤ort.
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cost function C (e). The kink in MBII occurs when pooling begins (e = 1
3
).
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The marginal benet from ex-ante investment (e¤ort) in general depends on the
current level of e¤ort.
Proposition 6 In the full game that includes an ex-ante investment decision, the rm
chooses an investment level that maximizes prots in the subgame net of R&D expendi-
tures. Arrows underinvestment problem exists in the ex-ante sense as well as ex-post,
but whether the existence of imperfectly informed consumers exacerbates or mitigates
this problem is in general ambiguous, depending on the curvature of the demand func-
tion, cost of R&D e¤ort function, and distribution of R&D outcomes.
Example 3 We revisit Example 1 in which it was demonstrated welfare may be higher
under imperfect than full information due to the new product signal alleviating the ex-
post underinvestment problem. We add an ex-ante investment stage to this example
to demonstrate that the new product signal may also mitigate the ex-ante underinvest-
ment problem and reconrm that total welfare may be higher under imperfect than full
information in the complete game.
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Let q = 1   p + E [A], A  U  1
2
+ e; 1
2
+ e

, M = 1
4
,  = 9
10
, R = 1
20
, and the
increasing and convex cost of e¤ort is given by C (e) = 1
16 ln 2
(24e   1). Then the ex-
ante underinvestment problem is mitigated as the imperfect information rm chooses
an investment level of eII  0:665 > 0:628  eFI which is greater than that chosen by
the full information rm. Total welfare is higher under imperfect information (1:331)
than full information (1:304). The Appendix contains further details.
6 Extension: imperfect learning
In the previous sections we assumed a simple learning structure that enabled all con-
sumers to determine the value of the new product attribute A after the rst period.
Learning occurred from personal consumption experiences or secondary sources such
as word-of-mouth communications or product review websites. Whereas such informa-
tion was not available to consumers in the rst period when the product was new, it
is assumed by the second period it is widely available at no cost. This implies strate-
gic consumption in the rst period for the purpose of information acquisition will not
occur.
We now conceptualize learning as an imperfect process from which much, though
not all, of consumersuncertainty about a products value is resolved. Such products
are of practical interest and lay along a continuum between two theoretical extremes:
Nelsons (1970) experience good, for which all uncertainty is resolved after consumption
and Darby and Karnis (1973) credence good, for which the consumer learns nothing
from consumption. In this section we allow for imperfect, or noisy, learning from
consumption and other sources and show that the main result from the perfect learning
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model generalizes to this context.
We operationalize noisy learning by assuming each consumer receives a common
signal X  a+  after the rst period that contains information about the realization
of A, denoted a, as well as an independent mean zero error term  whose distribution
is common knowledge. We assume f and h, the densities of A and  respectively, are
continuous with full support on R and h is log-concave so that consumersposterior
mean E [A j X = x] is increasing in the noisy signal x.26 ;27 Including a common error
term is justied on the grounds that consumers, whether or not they made a rst period
purchase, may receive the same information from inuential experts, product review
websites, blogs, or word-of-mouth communication. For this reason we assume the rm
observes the realization of  as well. For simplicity of analysis, we only consider the
subgame in which the R&D distribution has already been determined.
Before proceeding to the proposition we establish a lemma which, roughly speaking,
says that very low threshold types that sell a new product expect a bad outcome in
the second period.
Lemma 6 EXjA=c[(E [A j A > c;X])]! 0 as c!  1.
Proof Let fX(x) denote the density of X. Because fX(x) = h(x   c), the expected
26The assumption of full support simplies the presentation of the results.
27This ensures L(c) is monotonic and thus a unique attribute adoption threshold strategy exists.
The independence of A and  implies fX;A(y1; y2) = h(y1   y2)  f(y2). Consumersposterior mean is
increasing in x when X and A are a¢ liated, a su¢ cient condition for which is (Milgrom and Weber,
1982), for all y1 and y2, @
2
@y1@y2
log [h(y1   y2)  f(y2)]  0() @h@y1 (y1 y2)  @h@y2 (y1 y2)  @
2h
@y1@y2
(y1 
y2)  h(y1   y2)  0, which is equivalent to the log-concavity of h.
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prots to the threshold type-c rm EXjA=c[(E [A j A > c;X])] equal
Z t
 1
(E [A j A > c;X]) h(x  c)dx+
Z 1
t
(E [A j A > c;X]) h(x  c)dx
 J t  + J t+,
where J t
 
integrates over all signals less than t while J t
+
integrates over signals greater
than or equal to t. For any t we can select c low enough so as to assign as much mass
to signals less than t as we wish. That is, 8t, H(t   c) ! 1 as c !  1, and thus
t and c can be selected to assign arbitrarily large mass to arbitrarily negative values
of the signal. This implies J t
+ ! 0 because its mass is pinched to 0 and J t  ! 0
because E [A j A > c;X = x] !  1 and thus  (E [A j A > c;X = x]) ! 0 as c and
x approach  1.
We next show that the results from Proposition 1 generalize to this context, though
second period pricing and reversion decisions are now a function of the consumersnoisy
signal rather than the rms true type. We also incorporate our earlier brief discussion
of reverting the product in period 2 at cost R at this time and dene the highest
reverting type as ar which solves (0)  (ar) = R.
Proposition 7 Let consumers learn about product quality from noisy signal X = a+.
In the unique equilibrium there exists a threshold c such that the rm modies its
product whenever a > c and otherwise does not. In period 1 all new and improved
types charge the same high price pH = pE[AjA>c] whereas all unmodied types charge
the low price pL = p0. In period 2 all modied types charge the optimal price given
X and the rm reverts its product whenever E[A j A > c; X] < ar. The separating
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condition becomes
 (E [A]) M   min f (0) ; Rg+  (0) (19)
Proof This proof generalizes Proposition 1 by both adding imperfect learning. The
rst period gain G(c) to the type-c rm from modifying its product is identical to that
in the perfect learning case, as no learning has yet occurred in the rst period. The
type cs expected loss L is the modication cost M plus the expectation of lesser of
R and the di¤erence in prots earned between rejecting the product modication and
accepting it, where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of possible
signals the type-cs consumers receive:
L(c) =M +  EX [min fR; (0)  (E [A j A > c;X])g] , (20)
where X = a +  and the rm knows a = c but  is stochastic. First suppose R is
never the minimum in equation (20). Observe that EX [(E [A j A > c;X = c+ ])]
is monotonically increasing in c. This follows from the fact that c1 < c2 ! 8;
E [A j A > c1; X = c1 + ] < E [A j A > c2; X = c2 + ]. Thus L(c) is continuous and
non-increasing in c. If instead R is sometimes the minimum in equation (20) then the
integration with respect to X is taken of the constant R over some interval of signals
and of the term (0) (E [A j A > c;X]) on the remaining interval. By the arguments
above and the fact that R is a constant and thus non-increasing in c we again conclude
L(c) is continuous and non-increasing in c. The proof of Proposition 1 now applies and
the unique crossing condition is found by taking the limit c !  1 of G(c) < L(c).
Thus by Lemma 1 partial separation occurs if and only if equation (19) holds.
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Example 4 We extend Example 1 by allowing imperfect learning from the noisy signal
X = a +  where a is the rms true type and   U [ 0:1; 0:1]. As before, let q =
1  p+ E[A], A  U  1
2
; 1
2

, M = 1
4
,  = 9
10
, and R = 1
20
. Then in period 1 all types
greater than c  0:106 modify their products and charge price pH  0:651 whereas
types below this threshold continue selling their existing product and charge pL = 1
2
. In
period 2 consumers form a posterior mean from signal x and the rm charges a price
accordingly. No types revert to their old product because c  0.
Noting that the attribute adoption threshold in Example 1 was 0:136, we see that
noisy learning encourages adoption of weak attributes due to a lower expected second
period loss L(c). This in turn implies a weaker innovation signal in the sense that
adoption of an innovation has a less favorable impact on expected quality. These
results are general phenomena, which we state in the proposition below.
Proposition 8 The attribute adoption threshold is lower and the innovation signal is
weaker when learning is noisy than when it is perfect.
Proof The gain G(c) is realized in the rst period and therefore is not directly a¤ected
by the learning structure. The second period loss, however, is a¤ected. For any non-
degenerate prior and any realization of the noisy signal X, the posterior mean E[A
j A > c;X] > c. That is, if the rms true type is c then regardless of the signal
received consumersposterior expectation will always be more favorable when learning
is noisy than when it is perfect. Therefore integrating the rms prots overX preserves
the inequality:
EX [ (E[A j A > c;X])] > EX [ (c)] =  (c) . (21)
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This implies the second period cost L(c) in line (20) is weakly lower with noisy learning
and therefore so too is the adoption threshold. Finally, a lower adoption threshold
implies a weaker new product signal; i.e., c1 < c2 ) E[A j A > c1] < E[A j A > c2].
We now make a stronger assumption on the distribution of outcomes and signals
in order to nd that as learning from consumption becomes easier, rms apply a more
stringent standard to releasing new products.
Proposition 9 Let learning be imperfect with both noise and R&D outcomes normally
distributed. Then the equilibrium threshold increases as the variance of the noise term
decreases.
Proof More formally, let A  N (; 2) and   N (0; 2); the claim is c weakly
increases as 2 decreases. Consider the error terms i with variance 
2
i
for i = 1; 2
where 21 < 
2
2
. Let Xi = c+ i be the noisy signal consumers receive when facing the
threshold type-c rm given error term i and dene Li by using Xi in equation (20).
Then EX1 [(E[A j A > c;X1])] < EX2 [(E[A j A > c;X2])] implies L2(c)  L1(c),
thus establishing the result.
Remark 7 When learning is imperfect with both noise and R&D outcomes normally
distributed, schlimmbesserung attributes are less likely to exist as the variance of the
noise term decreases.
The economic interpretation of Proposition 9 is intuitive. A higher variance for 
implies a more noisy consumption experience so that learning is di¢ cult while a lower
variance allows for better learning from experience and thus increases the likelihood
that consumers will detect the rms true type. Knowing this, rms are deterred on the
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margin from making relatively minor modications when 2 is low so that c
 increases.
In particular, as 2 decreases the rm optimally responds by choosing larger c
 so that
Pr(fA 2 (c; 0]g) decreases.
This remark is of interest because of its potential empirical validation. Future
research might seek to estimate 2 by product category, quantify the benets (or costs)
of product enhancements made in these categories, and compare the proportion of
harmful to total product enhancements across the estimated levels of 2 . Relatively
higher proportions of harmful modications in product categories for which learning is
di¢ cult is consistent with our model.
7 Conclusion
Previous research has proposed consumer preferences for venturesomenessor novelty
to explain the high value consumers place on new products. We instead explain this
phenomenon through the information revealed by the existence of a new product that
has survived a rms endogenous censoring rule. We explore the interaction between
consumersrational beliefs about new and improvedproducts and a rms incentive
to introduce such products to consumers who are initially uninformed but later become
better informed of the products value. We nd that product newnessalone rationally
signals higher quality on average and hence confers a pricing and demand premium.
This premium induces the rm to adopt attributes that would prove unprotable
had all consumers been informed. A new product may only be trivially di¤erent from
its older version in the sense that its improvement in performance does not justify
its higher price. The new product demand premium from uninformed consumers may
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even be so high that a rm will fail to censor a schlimmbesserung attribute (improve-
ment for the worse) from its R&D process in order that its product appear as new,
notwithstanding the existence of better informed consumers in future periods. How-
ever, consumers rationally infer a weaker new product signal the higher the likelihood
trivial and schlimmbesserung attributes are added.
Given this result, it may seem that innovation signaling arising from imperfect in-
formation will result in lower ex-ante welfare than when consumers are fully informed.
However, full information su¤ers from its own problems: a monopolist has less mar-
ginal incentive to improve its product than does the social planner due to its desire to
maximize prots, not welfare. The demand premium provided by the innovation signal
alleviates this underinvestment problem by incentivizing the monopolist to adopt new
attributes it otherwise would not, thus possibly improving welfare. The incentive to
show-o¤with a new product may be too great though, over-solvingthe underinvest-
ment problem and lowering welfare.
We show the robustness of these results by extending the model to a noisy learning
environment in which initially uninformed consumers become better, though not per-
fectly, informed of the new products value in the second period when they make their
repeat purchase decision. This gives the rm even more incentive to adopt marginal
attributes so that the attribute adoption threshold is lower and the new product signal
is weaker when consumers learn through a noisy process rather than a perfect one. We
also endogenize the R&D distribution and investigate how the motive to signal quality
through selling a new version a¤ects the ex-ante investment decision. Other potential
extensions of the model include allowing the monopolist to concurrently sell the old
and new versions of its product, and generalizing the model to an oligopoly context.
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8 Appendix
Equivalence to a one-period model with some informed consumers
While our model contemplates a two-period setting in which initially uninformed
consumers learn about quality and so are informed in the second period, the proposi-
tions of this paper have analogues in a one-period model in which consumers start with
di¤erent information sets. This might occur because some consumers have subject-
matter expertise relating to the product while others do not (experts versus non-
experts). Or perhaps some consumers have low information acquisition costs (un-
modeled) while others nd it prohibitively costly to acquire information about new
products but do know that other consumers are informed. Such a model can be shown
to be equivalent to our two-period model in the case where the rm can price discrim-
inate between the informed and uninformed consumers. If price discrimination is not
possible, new product signaling may still exist but matters are complicated by the po-
tential for price signaling.28 Finally, the noisy learning aspect of the two-period model
manifests itself as an imperfectly informed expert who draws a noisy but informative
signal about the new products quality while non-experts are unable to do so.
The logic of the equivalence between these two models is as follows: whereas in
the two-period model the consumers in the second period served as a deterrent against
very low types selling a new and improvedproduct, in the one-period model informed
consumers serve this same role. Thus a one-period model with consumers distributed
on [0; v] according to g, of which a randomly selected proportion  are informed and
28Loosely, charging a high uniform price to informed and uninformed consumers alike is costly to a
low quality rm if the proportion of informed consumers is high. If informed consumers are su¢ ciently
rare, then such price signaling may fail while our existence results regarding new product signaling
nonetheless persist.
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(1 ) are uninformed is equivalent to a two-period model with consumers distributed
on [0; v] according to g0  (1   ) g and discount factor  = 
1  . In period 1 there
is a mass of
R v
0
(1  ) g = (1  ) consumers and in period 2 a discounted mass of R v
0
(1  ) g =  consumers. Note that when  > 1
2
we must mathematically allow for
 > 1. The preceding discussion leads us to the following Proposition:
Claim 1 The one-period model in which 1  of the mass g of consumers is uninformed
is equivalent to a two-period model in which the entire mass g0 = (1 ) g of consumers
is uninformed in period 1 and informed in period 2, with discount factor  = 
1  . Prior
propositions apply in the one-period model and the separating condition of Proposition
1 becomes:
(1  ) (E(A)) M  (0)) (22)
The claim has intuitive appeal: as  increases so that the rm is facing a more
informed set of consumers the equilibrium value of c increases and thus more lower-
valued product modications are censored. Equation 22 is true when the rm prefers to
sell its old product to the entire set of consumers than selling the average new product
to uninformed consumers only. We o¤er this alternative specication as a robustness
check to our model.29
29Indeed, one may combine the two models so that in period 1 the proportion 1 of consumers is
informed while in period 2 2 is informed. It is natural to suppose 0  1 < 2  1, either by a
simple exogenously imposed learning rule or a more elaborately designed learning structure. In either
event the preceding propositions can be shown to generally hold.
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Details for Example 3 Let q = 1 p+E [A], A  U  1
2
+ e; 1
2
+ e

,M = 1
4
,  = 9
10
,
R = 1
20
, and the increasing and convex cost of e¤ort is given by C (e) = 1
16 ln 2
(24e   1).
Note this implies the revenue function is  (a) =
 
1+a
2
2
. We nd the full information
(FI) rms threshold:
(1 + ) (bc) M = (1 + ) (0)
bc = 1
19
p
551  1  0:235 44
For 0  e  1
2
+ bc  0:735 some realizations will not be adopted by the FI rm, and
expected prots in this case are
(1 + )
Z bc
  1
2
+e
 (0) f (a) da+
Z 1
2
+e
bc [ (a) M ] f (a) da+ 
Z 1
2
+e
bc  (a) f (a) da
=
19
120
e3 +
57
80
e2 +
11
32
e+
29
1140
p
551  5
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while the marginal benet from investment is
MBFI =
19
40
e2 +
57
40
e+
11
32
.
When e > 1
2
+ bc  0:735, the distribution of outcomes will be so favorable that the FI
always accepts each realization. In this case prots to the FI rm are
Z 1
2
+e
  1
2
+e
[ (a) M ] f (a) da+ 9
10
Z 1
2
+e
  1
2
+e
 (a) f (a) da
=
19
40
e2 +
19
20
e+
127
480
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which implies the marginal benet from investment is
MBFI =
38
40
e+
19
20
In summary,
MBFI =
8><>:
19
40
e2 + 57
40
e+ 11
32
for 0  e < 1
2
+ 1
19
p
551  1
38
40
e+ 19
20
for e  1
2
+ 1
19
p
551  1
. (23)
We now turn to the imperfect information (II) rm. The equilibrium threshold
c found by solving
 (E [AjA > c]) +  (c) M = (1 + ) (0) 
1 + 1
2
 
1
2
+ e+ c

2
!2
+
9
10

1 + c
2
2
  1
4
=
19
10
 1
4
which implies that30
c =
1
46
p
2
p
 180e2   540e+ 2263  5
23
e  61
46
Separation occurs in the subgame when  1
2
+ e < c, which corresponds to 0  e <
30We reject the root   523e  146
p
2
p 180e2   540e+ 2263  6146 .
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1
38
p
2114  29
38
 0:447. We now calculate the II rms prots when there is separation:
(1 + )
Z c
  1
2
+e
 (0) f (a) da+
Z 1
2
+e
c
[ (a) M ] f (a) da+ 
Z 1
2
+e
c
 (a) f (a) da
=
65 981
194 672
e+
57 089
3893 440
p
2B   19
5840 160
B
3
2 +
311 847
486 680
e2 +
103 949
730 020
e3
  95
194 672
p
2e2B   285
194 672
p
2eB +
8665
389 344
where B =
p 180e2   540e+ 2263, which implies the marginal benet from invest-
ment is MBII =
2159 950
p
2e  2494 776Be  831 592Be2   659 810B + 461 700p2e2
 1946 720B
+
102 600
p
2e3 + 2547 375
p
2
 1946 720B .
When e  1
38
p
2114  29
38
 0:447 there is pooling and we nd prots for the II rm as
Z 1
2
+e
  1
2
+e
[ (a) M ] f (a) da+ 
Z 1
2
+e
  1
2
+e
 (a) f (a) da
=
19
40
e2 +
19
20
e+
127
480
which implies
MBII =
38
40
e+
19
20
In summary, the marginal benet from e¤ort is
8><>:
 (2159 950
p
2e 2494 776Be 831 592Be2 659 810B+461 700p2e2+102 600p2e3+2547 375p2)
1946 720B
, e < 0:447
38
40
e+ 19
20
, e  0:447
(24)
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We now solve for the optimal ex-ante investment level under full and imperfect
information, denoted eFI and e

II respectively. Given C (e) =
1
16 ln 2
(24e   1), the mar-
ginal cost of investment is MC (e) = 2
4e
4
. We set this equal to MBFI found in line 23
and solve 2
4e
4
= 19
40
e2 + 57
40
e + 11
32
to nd eFI  0:628. Similarly we equate MC (e) and
MBII found in line 24 and solve 2
4e
4
= 38
40
e+ 19
20
to nd eII  0:665.
We now calculate the FI rms expected prots when eFI = 0:628.

19
120
e3 +
57
80
e2 +
11
32
e+
29
1140
p
551  5
64

  C (e)
 0:631
Consumer surplus in this case is found using the facts that q = 1 p+a and bc  0:235 ,
and eFI = 0:627978 implies A  U [0:127978; 1:127978].
2
 
1
8
Z 0:235 44
0:127978
da+
Z 1:127978
0:235 44
1
2

1 + a
2
2
da
!
= 0:672 74
so that total surplus under FI is
TSFI = 1: 303 7.
We now calculate prots and consumer surplus under II. Expected prots given
eII = 0:665 are

19
40
e2 +
19
20
e+
127
480

  C (e)
 0:626 66
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Expected consumers surplus is calculated using q = 1   p + a, and eII = 0:665486
implies A  U [0:165486; 1:165486]. Also, since eII > 0:446 80 there is pooling which
implies in the rst period consumers have beliefs E (A) = 0:665486. Thus in the rst
period p = 0:832 74 = q and consumer surplus in this period is
CSII1 =
Z 1:165486
0:165486
Z 0:832 74
0
((1  q + a)  0:832 74) dq

da
= 0:346 73
while in the second period it is
CSII2 =
Z 1:165486
0:165486
1
2

1 + a
2
2
da
= 0:357 15
Thus CSII = 0:346 73 + 0:357 15 = 0:703 88 and we nd
TSII = 1: 330 5
and thus total surplus is higher under II than FI.
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Chapter 2: Physician Overtreatment and
Undertreatment with Partial Delegation
Dmitry Lubensky and Eric Schmidbauer
Abstract
The physician induced demand literature nds that doctors tend to
overtreat patients for nancial gain. We analyze this phenomenon when
patients are rationally skeptical of doctorsmotives and can reject a pro-
posed treatment. We nd the classic physician induced demand approach
understates patientswelfare loss: treatment on average is excessive but
also less medically appropriate, and the latter e¤ect may dominate. In-
appropriate treatment arises from the doctors strategic misdiagnosis to
forestall rejection, but this problem can be attenuated by insurance which
better aligns incentives and improves communication. We resolve an open
question in the partial delegation literature by showing that a generaliza-
tion of the Krishna and Morgan (2001) equilibrium is the most informative
equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion in a setting that nests both
our and their model.
Keywords: physician induced demand, over-utilization, non-compliance,
partial delegation, cheap talk
JEL Classication: D82, I10
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1 Introduction
Excessive treatment is a widely recognized problem in the United States health care
market, with estimates of avoidable clinical care at 30% of total health care spending.1
An often cited cause of this phenomenon is the nancial incentive of doctors to pre-
scribe more treatment than is medically prudent (Emanuel and Fuchs, 2008). Doctors
prescribe medicines with a higher markup when they prot from dispensing medicine
(IIzuka, 2007), perform more caesarean deliveries when fee di¤erentials between normal
and cesarean childbirths are higher (Gruber et al., 1999), and are more likely to rec-
ommend radiation treatment for cancer when the prescription is self-referring (GAO,
2013).
The physician induced demand (PID) hypothesis posits that due to their informa-
tional advantage doctors can induce higher preferences for treatment by overstating
the severity of a patients condition (Evans, 1974; McGuire, 2000). While this theory
predicts overtreatment, its implication of a fully compliant patient is inconsistent with
ndings that physiciansorders are often ignored due to a lack of trust (Brownlie et
al., 2008), specically when the patient suspects a doctors nancial motive (Chen and
Vargas-Bustamante, 2013).
When patients are rationally skeptical of doctorsmotives it is no longer clear that
the PID hypothesis holds. If the doctor expects the patient to be suspicious of the
diagnosis, might the doctor propose a weaker instead of stronger treatment to keep
the proposed treatment from being rejected? Or might the doctor exaggerate the
1New England Healthcare Institute (Feb 2008), Waste and ine¢ ciency in the U.S. health care
systemand Thomson Reuters (Oct 2009), Where can $700 billion in waste be cut annually from
the U.S. healthcare system?White Paper. Robert Kelley, Vice President of Healthcare Analytics
Thomson Reuter.
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diagnosis even more to make the patient too scared to reject the treatment? Is the
equilibrium incentive to under- or overtreat constant across all health states or are
some illnesses more likely to be under- or overtreated than others? Finally, would a
policy of reducing the nancial incentives of doctors, such as reducing reimbursements,
banning self-referrals, or instituting tort reform, improve the welfare of patients?
To address these questions, we model the interaction between an informed doctor
and an uninformed patient as a game of partial delegation (e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel,
1987; Krishna and Morgan, 2001). The doctor observes the health of the patient
and prescribes a treatment, which the patient may either accept or reject in favor of
whatever treatment is available without the doctors prescription.2 Thus the doctor
plays both the role of an informed expert and an authority that determines the set of
available options. The doctor and patient agree on the medical prudence of a treatment,
but disagree due to nancial considerations. Additional treatment is more costly for
the patient and is more protable for the doctor, so that for any illness the doctor
prefers more treatment than the patient.
We nd that on net the patient undergoes more treatment in equilibrium than he
would prefer, so the PID hypothesis holds. In fact, the average treatment is exactly
what would ensue if the patient blindly followed the doctors orders as in the classic ap-
proach to PID without patient skepticism. More importantly, we demonstrate that the
classic PID hypothesis signicantly understates the welfare impact of doctorsnan-
cial incentives by ignoring strategic considerations. Patients not only receive too much
treatment but the treatment they receive is also on average less medically appropriate.
Less appropriate treatment arises from the doctor altering his diagnosis to over-
2In the main model the outside option is no treatment. In a later section we allow the patient to
seek out a second opinion.
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come patient skepticism. For mild illnesses, the doctor prescribes a minimal treatment
to avoid being rejected and for intermediate illnesses, the doctor exaggerates the di-
agnosis to induce the patient to accept a high treatment. This leads to under- and
overtreatment in that for some illnesses the patient receives less treatment than either
he or the doctor would prefer and for other illnesses he receives more treatment than
either would prefer. The presence of over- and undertreatment is important for patient
welfare: although it turns out not to impact the level of average treatment, it reduces
the average medical appropriateness of treatment. The impact of the doctors nancial
incentive on patient welfare through the medical appropriateness of treatment is of a
similar magnitude, and sometimes larger, than the impact through treatment level.
We demonstrate the existence of over- and undertreatment regions is robust to model
extensions in which patients may seek a second opinion or in which some consumers
naively accept all treatment recommendations.
As fees for medical services increase, both overtreatment and undertreatment also
increase. A higher fee increases the distance between the doctors and patients pre-
ferred treatments, which exacerbates the doctors incentive to strategically misdiagnose
and leads to less appropriate treatment. We use this principle to investigate the e¤ect
of actuarially fair insurance on treatment. A patient who purchases insurance reduces
his ex-post cost of medical services, bringing his incentives closer to the doctors and
leading to more e¤ective communication and thus more appropriate treatment. On the
other hand, having insurance makes a patient less likely to reject treatment, for which
he must pay ex-ante with a higher premium. We demonstrate that when the patients
health state is distributed uniformly, the former communication e¤ect dominates the
latter moral hazard e¤ect and the patient prefers full insurance. Thus even risk neu-
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tral patients nd insurance valuable as a means to reduce the doctors incentive to
strategically misdiagnose.
Our paper is related to the work of Pitchik and Schotter (1987) and De Jaegher and
Jegers (2001) who analyze a cheap talk game in which doctors make a recommendation
to skeptical patients who can obtain any available treatment. The authors depart
from the standard Crawford and Sobel (1982) framework by assuming that the doctor
prefers the maximal treatment regardless of the patients health and that doctors and
patients have a di¤erent ordering over treatments. No pure strategy equilibrium can be
supported and instead there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which under-
and overtreatment occur. Since in our model the doctors preferred treatment depends
on the patients health, patients are not free to choose among all treatments, and the
preference ordering adheres to the Crawford Sobel paradigm, we obtain qualitatively
di¤erent predictions. For example, an increase in the patients out-of-pocket price of
the high treatment in De Jaegher and Jegers (2001) increases patient welfare while we
nd the opposite in our setting. Finally, other factors a¤ecting the doctors incentive to
overprescribe treatment have been explored, including the role of reputation (Dranove,
1988) and second opinions (Rochaix, 1989; Pitchik and Schotter, 1993).
We model the doctor-patient relationship in a partial delegation framework since
it captures the common situation where patients have veto-power over treatments but
do not have the authority to unilaterally pursue their own treatment. Alternatively,
communication could be modeled within a cheap talk framework where the patient has
decision-making power and the physician acts solely as an advisor; e.g., when the pa-
tient discusses over-the-counter medicine with a pharmacist. In this case the Crawford
and Sobel (1982) model predicts that communication is noisy so there is both over- and
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undertreatment, but that average treatment is no higher or lower than without com-
munication; i.e., there is no PID overall. At the other extreme the relationship could be
modeled as full delegation (Dessein, 2002) where the patient cedes all decision-making
power to the doctor; e.g., when a patient is institutionalized. In this case patient skepti-
cism is irrelevant and the doctor always gets his preferred choice so there is always PID
as in the classic approach without any variation due to strategic diagnosis. Comparing
these approaches, partial delegation not only captures what is arguably the typical
doctor-patient relationship, but is the only one of the three standard frameworks that
features non-trivial PID.
In addition to applying partial delegation to the issue of PID, we also contribute
to the general literature on partial delegation models in which a principal delegates
decision making authority to an informed agent but retains the right to veto in favor of
the status quo option. Of particular relevance is Krishna and Morgans (2001) analysis
of legislative rules that models an informed but biased committee comprised of homo-
geneous members that makes policy proposals to an uninformed legislature.3 For a
range of values of the status quo they compare the informativeness of equilibria under
cheap talk versus partial delegation. While they nd a partial delegation equilibrium
that dominates all cheap talk equilibria, whether or not this equilibrium is the best
partial delegation equilibrium has remained an open question. Our strategic environ-
ment di¤ers from theirs in that the status quo in our model is no treatment while in
their model the status quo is a moderate policy in the interior of the action space. In
a general setting that nests both models, we characterize the set of equilibria which
3Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987; 1989) were the rst to posit an informational rationale for rules that
restrict amendments to committee proposals, while Krishna and Morgan followed up on their analysis.
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survive the intuitive criterion and identify the most informative equilibrium.4 In the
process we conrm that Krishna and Morgans equilibrium is most informative given
their status quo assumption, thereby providing additional justication for the use of
their equilibrium in other contexts where it is applied.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we review the medical litera-
ture on the existence of and explanations for both over- and undertreatment. Section 3
outlines the model while Section 4 characterizes the most informative equilibrium that
survives the intuitive criterion and explores comparative statics on policy variables af-
fecting the nancial incentives of doctors and patients. In Section 5 we explore the role
of health insurance as a means for a patient to commit to accepting the doctors treat-
ment. Section 6 conrms that over- and undertreatment persist even when patients
can obtain a second opinion or some proportion of patients always naively comply with
a doctors recommendation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Medical literature on over- and undertreatment
...up to one-third of the over $2 trillion that we now spend annually
on health care is squandered on unnecessary hospitalizations; unneeded
and often redundant tests; unproven treatments; over-priced, cutting-edge
drugs; devices no better than the less expensive products they replaced; and
end-of-life care that brings neither comfort nor cure (Dartmouth Medicine,
2007).
Discussion of overtreatment in the United States health care market is commonplace
4Marino (2007) uses the intuitive criterion in a partial delegation setting, though the exercise is to
check the criterion is satised by a particular equilibrium rather than characterizing the full set.
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and so we do not relay the litany of statistics here again. However, we do briey explore
reasons for this overtreatment. As with undertreatment subsequently discussed below,
it is di¢ cult for the researcher observe whether a given treatment was inadequate or
excessive as this requires knowledge of the patients true health state. This should be
kept in mind in the discussion below.
Emanuel and Fuchs (2008) suggest four main drivers of overutilization attributable
to physicians. First, they posit a medical culture in which meticulousness, not e¢ -
ciency, is rewarded; a more is bettermindset does not adequately consider the cost
of care. Second, the fee-for-service payment system incentivizes physicians to perform
unnecessary tests and procedures. This is compounded by signicantly higher reim-
bursements for tests and procedures than evaluation and management of conditions.
Third, the abundance of new medical devices and pharmaceuticals forces physicians to
rely upon potentially biased industry marketing reps for information. Finally, physi-
cians engage in defensive medicine to shield themselves from claims of malpractice.
Some researchers have even proposed that excess supply causes overutilization; thus,
for example, more aggressive care for chronically ill patients in cities like Los Angeles
and Miami is caused by more hospital beds per capita, more medical specialists,
and more internists (Dartmouth Medicine, 2007). Patients also play their part in
overtreatment, be it due to a patient bias for high technology over high touch, the
a¤ects of direct-to-consumer marketing, and the moral hazard introduced by a third-
party payment system (Emanuel and Fuchs, 2008).
The medical and health economics literature has studied the physicians inuence on
a patients actions though the notion of physician-induced demand.McGuire (2000)
o¤ers the following denition: physician-induced demand (PID) exists when the physi-
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cian inuences a patients demand for care against the physicians interpretation of the
best interest of the patient.Evans (1974) provided the rst theoretical model of PID,
variants of which (McGuire and Pauly, 1991; Gruber and Owings, 1996) remain pop-
ular among empiricists testing for evidence of the phenomenon. In these models, the
doctor can alter a patients preferences for the quantity of treatment through his level
of inducement. While the doctors utility is increasing in income (and thus the quantity
of treatment provided), it is decreasing in inducement due to a psychological cost of
misleading his patient. Empirical studies of PID predominantly use this framework to
test physician responses to changes in the doctor to population ratio or to fee changes.
A limitation of the Evans paradigm is its lack of explicit consideration of the patients
decision making process, which is central to our analysis below.
There is also an extensive medical literature on patient non-adherenceor non-
compliancewith a physicians recommendations, possibly leading to undertreatment.
Generally speaking, compliance can be dened as the extent to which a patients behav-
ior coincides with medical or health advice (Vermeire et al., 2001). Recent studies on
prescription drug non-compliance found that 22% of all prescriptions are never lled
(Fischer et al., 2010) while this rate was slightly higher for newly prescribed drugs
(Fischer et al., 2011). One meta-analysis of patient compliance to a range of treat-
ment regiments (e.g., medication, screening, exercise, health behavior, appointment,
diet) found an average non-adherence rate of about 25% (DiMatteo, 2004b) while an-
other concluded that poor compliance is to be expected in 30-50% of all patients,
irrespective of disease, prognosis, or setting(Vermeire et al., 2001).
Numerous explanations and correlates for non-compliance have been proposed: cost;
demographic variables; the duration of the treatment, the number of medications pre-
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scribed and frequency of dosing; salience / mindfulness; direct-to-consumer advertising;
side-e¤ects; complexity of the regimen and poor physician communication; illness sever-
ity; lack of transportation to medical facilities; lack of social support; depression; and,
though di¢ cult to measure, the nature of the doctor-patient relationship (Bowman
et al, 2004; Dellande et al, 2004; DiMatteo, 2004a and 2004b; DiMatteo et al., 2000;
DiMatteo et al, 2007; Hausman, 2004; Vermeire et al., 2001; Wosinska, 2005; Wroth
and Pathman, 2006; Zolnierek and DiMatteo, 2009). More generally, compliance is
inuenced by the perceived costs, benets, and e¢ cacy of care (Becker and Maiman,
1975) as argued by the well-known Health Belief Model:
Compliance is thought to be determined by the knowledge and attitudes
of the patient. Patients must believe that they are vulnerable or susceptible
to the disease or its consequences, that they actually have it, and that the
consequences of the disease on their well-being could be serious. They must
believe that by following a particular set of health recommendations the
threat or severity of the condition will be abolished or reduced (Vermeire
et al., 2001).
The centrality of patient beliefs to the compliance decision underscores another
crucial factor: patient trust in a physician. Trust has been shown to a¤ect patients
utilization of medical services (Ling et al., 2006; Miller et al., 2001; Mollborn et al.,
2005) and adherence to therapeutic regimens (Stepanikova and Cook, 2008). The latter
includes accepting and adhering to a prescription drug schedule (Altice et al., 2001;
Kerse et al., 2004; Thom et al., 1999); adherence to behavioral advice about smoking,
alcohol use, seat belt use, diet, exercise, stress, and safe sex practices (Safran et al.,
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1998); willingness to undergo invasive testing (Collins et al., 2002); and intentions to
comply with physician advice generally (Keating et a, 2002; Thom et al., 2002).
Trust in physicians is often strained by patientsperception of bias. The pharma-
ceutical industry in particular is viewed with suspicion (Go¤ et al., 2008). Surveys of
the public reveal that a majority believe their doctor receives gifts from the pharmaceu-
tical industry and that those with such beliefs are more likely to report low physician
trust (Grande et al., 2012). In addition, doctors with higher self-reported ties to indus-
try have higher patient non-compliance with treatment recommendations (Chen and
Vargas-Bustamante, 2013). Patients might be wise to consider their doctors nancial
motives in recommending a particular treatment. For example, researchers have found
that larger fee di¤erentials between cesarean and normal childbirth for the Medicaid
program leads to higher cesarean delivery rates (Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin, 1999). In
this paper we argue that doctor bias and the resulting lack of trust by patients is a key
friction undermining the credible transmission of information from doctor to patient.
3 Model
A patients health state  is distributed uniformly on [0; 1], with higher values corre-
sponding to more serious illnesses. A doctor observes the realization of  and makes
a recommendation m  0 for treatment. The patient knows only the distribution of 
and can either take the prescribed treatment a = m or a status quo a = 0 representing
no treatment.
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Payo¤s for the doctor and patient are
ud(a j) =  1
2
(   a)2 + (p  c) a;
up(a j) =  1
2
(   a)2   pa:
The rst term in each payo¤reects the medical prudence of a treatment, on which both
the doctor and patient agree. The second term captures nancial incentives, whereby
the patient pays the doctor a price p for each unit of treatment and the doctor incurs
a marginal cost c. Both p and c are exogenous and we assume that p  c. For any
health state  the doctors preferred treatment is
ad() =  + (p  c) ;
and the patients preferred treatment is
ap() =    p:
Preferences closely resemble those in standard cheap talk (e.g., Crawford and Sobel,
1982) and delegation (e.g., Krishna and Morgan, 2001; Dessein, 2002) models in which
the preferred action of the doctor exceeds that of the patient by a xed amount captured
by a biasparameter, and the loss from suboptimal actions is quadratic. By explicitly
incorporating nancial incentives here, we can perform comparative statics on the
price and cost of treatment, and later on insurance, that would not be feasible with a
standard reduced-form bias parameter.
We solve for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, namely a strategy m() for the doctor
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and a strategy a(m) and posterior distribution Fm() for the patient so that strategies
are mutual best responses and beliefs are formed by Bayes rule whenever possible. For
the purpose of equilibrium characterization it will be su¢ cient to consider the patients
posterior expectation (m)  R  dFm() conditional on message m.
4 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
Under the strict notion of PID the doctor induces his preferred treatment for every
health state. We begin this section by demonstrating this notion of PID does not
survive when patients are skeptical and can reject treatment.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium in which a() =  + (p  c) for all .
This follows from the fact that in such a conjectured equilibrium, the patient per-
fectly infers his health. Specically, when the doctor prescribes action p c, the patient
understands that his health is  = 0, for which his outside option is best and thus he
rejects. While the strict notion of PID does not survive, we will show it may still exist
in this context if it is interpreted in terms of average treatment.
Next we characterize our equilibrium and restrict attention to parameters for which
doctor and patient preferences are su¢ ciently aligned, namely we assume 3p   c  1
2
throughout the paper.5
Proposition 1 Let 3p   c  1
2
. Then m(), a(m), and (m) constitute a perfect
5Parameters outside this range can still support equilibria with information transmission but lead
to corner solutions that complicate the analysis and are omitted for clarity. In Appendix A, we remove
this parameter restriction when solving for the full set of equilibria that survive the intuitive criterion.
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Bayesian equilibrium when dened as follows. The doctor prescribes
m() =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
p  c if 0   < 3p  c
7p  3c if 3p  c    6p  2c
 + p  c if 6p  2c <   1
The patient accepts treatment if and only if prescribed as above and has beliefs
(m) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if 0  m < p  c
3p c
2
if m = p  c
m (p c)
2
if p  c < m < 7p  3c
9p 3c
2
if m = 7p  3c
m  (p  c) if 7p  3c < m
The proof that this constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a special case of the
more general equilibrium characterization in Appendix A and therefore omitted here.
An example of the equilibrium for particular values of p and c is depicted in Figure 1.
The two dashed lines represent preferred actions: the line below represents the patients
preferences and the line above the doctors. For mild illnesses the patient receives a
single minimal treatment that is less than what the doctor prefers and, for some states,
also less than what the patient prefers. For intermediate illnesses, the patient receives
a large treatment that is higher than his and even the doctors preferred action. For
su¢ ciently serious illnesses, the patient receives the treatment preferred by the doctor.
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Figure 1: In solid, equilibrium treatment when p = 0:1 and c = 0:05. In dark dashed,
the patients preferred treatment as a function of the health state. In light dashed, the
doctors preferred treatment as a function of the health state.
Treatments in the intervals a 2 (0; p   c) [ (p   c; 7p   3c) are o¤-the equilibrium
path and thus admit a variety of beliefs. The particular beliefs above were chosen for
concreteness and we will later show they satisfy the intuitive criterion.
The logic behind the equilibrium reects the fact that the patient has the option of
no treatment and is skeptical of the doctors motives. The patient accepts a signicant
treatment only when he infers from the diagnosis that he is quite sick. This accounts for
the fact that in equilibrium intermediate treatments a 2 (p   c; 7p   3c) are rejected.
When the doctors preferred treatment falls in this range, he must choose whether
to overstate beyond his nancial incentive or conversely to understate and induce a
minimal treatment instead of being rejected altogether. In equilibrium the doctor does
both: he induces a single minimal treatment for relatively healthier states (0    3p 
c) and a single overly strong treatment for relatively sicker states (3p c    6p 2c).
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The doctors inability to customize his diagnosis based on his information reduces
average treatment appropriateness, and in this way patients skepticism exacerbates
the e¤ect of the doctors nancial incentives.
Equilibrium Selection
It is well-known that in games of communication, and in particular in our partial
delegation setting, there is a multiplicity of equilibria. For example, there exists a
trivial equilibrium in which the patient accepts only zero treatment, which is supported
by o¤ the path beliefs that any prescription for a strictly positive treatment is made
when the doctor observes  = 0. While this particular equilibrium does not survive
standard renements, the equilibrium set contains other non-trivial equilibria which
may not be ruled out so easily.
The issue of equilibrium selection has played an important role in this literature,
namely related to the question of whether partial delegation or cheap talk is the bet-
ter communication mechanism. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989) identify a partial
delegation equilibrium and a cheap talk equilibrium and demonstrate that depending
on parameter values either can dominate the other. Krishna and Morgan (2001) follow
up on this work by nding a di¤erent partial delegation equilibrium that dominates
all cheap talk equilibria, thus concluding that partial delegation is the better protocol.
However, the authors leave open whether the equilibrium they nd is most informa-
tive. Since the aim of our work is not to compare mechanisms but rather to explore
equilibrium properties, the unresolved question of selection in the partial delegation
framework is central to our analysis.
Our approach is to focus only on equilibria that survive the Cho and Kreps (1987)
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intuitive criterion, and of this set select the equilibrium which is most informative,
dened as follows:
Denition 1 The informativeness of an equilibrium is V ar [   a ()].
Krishna and Morgan provide justication for informativeness as an appropriate
metric by which to measure equilibria. In our model and the Crawford and Sobel
framework in general, the quadratic loss function implies that the preferences of the
doctor and the patient can be decomposed into preferences over the average treatment
and the variance of treatment. Conditional on average treatment, both the doctor and
patient are better o¤ when variance is reduced, thus the set of treatment allocations
which minimize variance can be thought of as a Pareto frontier. Under cheap talk,
all equilibria are associated with the same expected treatment, hence if welfare is the
weighted sum of the utilities of the doctor and the patient, maximizing informativeness
is equivalent to maximizing welfare regardless of the weights. In the partial delegation
environment, di¤erent equilibria may be associated with di¤erent expected actions,
thus moving to an equilibrium with less variance but a di¤erent expected treatment
may harm either the doctor or the patient. However, the move to less variance is a move
toward the Pareto frontier, and since in our specication preferences are quasilinear in
health and money, this move would make both parties better o¤ given an appropriate
cash transfer.6
Using both the intuitive criterion and informativeness for equilibrium selection, we
obtain the following results.
6An alternative approach is to rank equilibria based on a specic weighted average of the utilities
of the doctor and patient. The choice of such weights would be arbitrary, especially given that both
parties have some control over the treatment decision.
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Proposition 2 The equilibrium in Proposition 1 is the most informative equilibrium
that survives the intuitive criterion.
Proposition 3 The closed rule equilibrium in Proposition 8 in Krishna and Morgan
(2001) is the most informative equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion in their
parameter range.
The proof of both of these propositions is obtained by characterizing the most
informative equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion in a more general setting
which nests both our model and the model of Krishna andMorgan (2001). In particular,
the framework allows for a fuller range of treatment preference parameters and a status
quo of zero as in our model or interior status quo as in Krishna and Morgan (2001).
The details can be found in Appendix A.
Equilibrium Properties
Lemma 1 demonstrates that the strict notion of the PID hypothesis, in which the
doctor induces his preferred action for every illness, does not survive in our setting
with skeptical patients. However, the following corollary demonstrates that PID still
holds in our context when reinterpreted in terms of average treatment.
Corollary 1 In the equilibrium in Proposition 1, E[a()] = E[] + (p  c).
Stated di¤erently, the expected treatment in equilibrium is exactly what would
ensue if the doctor could induce his preferred treatment for every illness. An empirical
analysis which nds an increased average treatment level in the presence of doctors
nancial incentives is thus consistent both with the classic notion of PID and with
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our partial delegation framework. However, due to the information loss associated
with partial delegation, the classic PID model understates the welfare e¤ect of doctors
nancial incentives, and we explore this here in more detail.
Denition 2 State  is overtreated if a () > ad () and undertreated if a () < a

p ().
Thus an illness is overtreated if the treatment exceeds that preferred by the doctor
and undertreated when it falls below that preferred by the patient. We use weak de-
nitions of over- and undertreatment by remaining agnostic about the relative weights
on the utilities of the doctor and patient. Alternatively, one may construct a sharper
denition of over- and undertreatment by dening a benchmark that would be chosen
by a social planner. For example, a social planner that weighs the medical prudence of
an action against its true cost would have a utility usp(aj ) =  12(  a)2  ca and an
optimal treatment plan asp() =  c. It is clear that the existence of over- and under-
treatment under our weak denition implies the existence of over- and undertreatment
with respect to this benchmark, in fact with respect to any benchmark in which the
preferred action falls between the preferred actions of the doctor and patient.
In Figure 1, undertreatment occurs for some states for which the minimal treatment
(a = p   c) is undertaken and overtreatment occurs for all states for which the high
treatment (a = 7p  3c) is undertaken. More generally, we show that over- and under-
treatment are guaranteed to occur for all parameters p and c admissible in Proposition
1.
Corollary 2 In the equilibrium in Proposition 1 both under- and overtreatment exist.
Namely, states  2 (2p   c; 3p   c] are undertreated and  2 (3p   c; 6p   2c) are
overtreated.
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Proof By construction of the equilibrium in Proposition 1, it can be veried that for
health states near but below the state  = 3p   c at which there is a discontinuity in
treatment, the equilibrium treatment of p   c is below that preferred by the patient.
For all states above  2 [3p   c; 6p   2c) the treatment is greater than that preferred
by the doctor.
The notions of over- and undertreatment help us understand the informational
e¤ects of a doctors nancial incentives beyond their e¤ect on average treatment level.
For any two treatment plans a1() and a2() for which E[a1()] = E[a2()], both the
doctor and the patient prefer plan a1() whenever it has less over- and undertreatment
than a2(). This is because plan a1() induces actions that are closer to those preferred
by both the doctor and patient than treatment plan a2(), and thus we refer to it as
more appropriate.
The connection between over- and undertreatment and patient welfare can be for-
mally established by decomposing the e¤ect of doctorsnancial incentives on equi-
librium treatment. First, denote by Up(a())  E[up(a()j)] the patients expected
utility from following treatment plan a(). Recall that ap() and a

d() are the patients
and doctors rst best treatment plans, and let aeqm() be the equilibrium treatment
plan. The equilibrium utility loss for the patient relative to his rst best can be ex-
pressed as
Up(a

p)  Up(aeqm)| {z } = Up(ap)  Up(ad)| {z } + Up(ad)  Up(aeqm)| {z }
Total Welfare Loss Loss from Loss from
Classic PID Treatment Appropriateness
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The rst term on the right hand side describes the di¤erence in the patients utility
between obtaining his or the doctors rst-best treatments. We label this term the
classic PID e¤ect since Corollary 1 established that the average equilibrium treatment
is the same as if the doctor induced his preferred treatment for every state. Because it
is never optimal for the doctor to induce over- or undertreatment as we have dened
them, the impact of these outcomes must be contained in the second term of the
decomposition, which we now demonstrate is strictly positive.
Corollary 3 The loss in treatment appropriateness is strictly positive; that is,
Up(a

d)  Up(aeqm) > 0:
Proof The patients expected utility from any treatment prole a() can be expressed
as the sum of two terms:
Up(a()) =  1
2
E[(a()  )2]  pE[a()]:
Moving from the doctors rst-best treatment prole to the equilibrium treatment
prole constitutes a mean preserving spread in a() . Thus for equilibrium treatments
the rst term is larger than and the second term is equal to that under the doctors
rst-best treatment prole.
Corollary 3 conrms that by ignoring treatment appropriateness classic PID un-
derstates the impact of a doctors nancial incentives on patient welfare. In fact, we
now show that treatment appropriateness can be a more important consideration than
treatment level.
Corollary 4 When the marginal cost of treatment c is high, treatment inappropriate-
ness harms patient welfare more than treatment level; that is,
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Up(a

p)  Up(ad) < Up(ad)  Up(aeqm):
The proof is included in Appendix B, however here we provide a brief sketch.
Conjecture a situation in which the doctor fully passes through an increase in cost
c. Since the doctors markup p   c is unchanged, his preferred treatment remains
unchanged and by extension so does the average treatment undertaken in equilibrium.
However, since the patients price of treatment increases, the incentives of the doctor
and patient diverge and this leads to less appropriate treatment. When c is increased
su¢ ciently in this margin-neutral way, the loss from ine¤ective treatment can surpass
the loss from the treatment level.
Our results about the expected level of treatment in Corollary 1 and the expected
appropriateness of treatment in Corollary 3 can be understood in the context of how the
partial delegation environment is situated between pure cheap talk (Crawford Sobel,
1982) and full delegation (Dessein, 2002). With cheap talk, the patient is unrestricted
in his choice of treatment and for every diagnosis maximizes expected utility conditional
on his posterior. Because the patients posterior is correct, it is as if the patient chooses
his rst best treatment on average, thus there is no PID, but because communication
is coarse the patient sometimes chooses ine¤ective treatment.7 The other extreme
is full delegation, in which the patient has no choice and must accept the doctors
preferred action. There is no noise, which causes treatment to be appropriate, and
PID exists in the strict sense. Under partial delegation, the doctor is neither simply an
advisor nor the decision maker, instead he makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. Again, the
patients posterior is correct in equilibrium but his optimal treatment is not available.
Instead, the doctor constructs the o¤er so as to make the patient indi¤erent between
7This argument follows formally when optimal treatment is linear in patient beliefs, as it is in the
quadratic loss specication.
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accepting and rejecting, extracting the surplus from the interaction and on average
inducing his preferred treatment.8 With partial delegation, PID exists in terms of
average treatment and noisy communication reduces treatment e¤ectiveness. Thus
partial delegation is the only communication protocol in which the doctors nancial
incentives a¤ect treatment both through average level and average e¤ectiveness.
Comparative Statics
Our model has two parameters, p and c, that correspond to policy interventions such
as changes in reimbursement rates, subsidies for medical supplies, changes in medical
technology, etc. Here we explore the impact of such interventions on the utilities of
the doctor and the patient. In addition, we track the impact on the total level of over-
and undertreatment, which we dene as the ex-ante probability that a state with over-
or undertreatment occurs.9
Proposition 4 The following table summarizes the e¤ect of p and c on patient and
doctor utility, overtreatment, and undertreatment.
Increase in Upatient Udoctor Overtreatment Undertreatment
p   +=  + +
c +     0
p and c     + +
8The analogy holds for mild and intermediate illnesses; for severe illnesses the doctor can induce
his preferred treatment without having to make the patient indi¤erent to rejecting.
9An alternative denition is the patients utility loss relative to his rst best in regions of under-
treatment and the doctors utility loss relative to his rst best in regions of over-treatment. In our
equilibrium this denition induces the same ranking of treatment plans and we use ours for simplicity.
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These results are derived in Appendix B by using the closed form solution of the
equilibrium in Proposition 1. Consider rst the tables top two rows. An increase in
p a¤ects patient utility in three ways. First, its direct e¤ect is to raise the patients
total health expenditure if treatment remains unchanged. It also has an indirect PID
e¤ect whereby a higher price causes the doctor to induce higher average treatment.
Finally, an increase in p exacerbates the di¤erence in doctor and patient preferences,
thus causing less appropriate treatment through more over- and undertreatment. The
net e¤ect of a higher p on patient welfare is thus unambiguously negative. The e¤ect
of p on the utility of the doctor can similarly be decomposed into the three separate
e¤ects. The direct e¤ect is positive while the PID e¤ect is zero because the doctor
always obtains his preferred average treatment in equilibrium. Because treatment
e¤ectiveness declines, the net e¤ect on the doctors utility is ambiguous.
A similar logic applies to the e¤ect of c on the utilities of the doctor and patient. A
seemingly surprising result emerges: a higher cost c of treatment increases the welfare
of the patient. This follows within the model since a higher c corresponds to closer
doctor and patient preferences. However, this particular comparative static assumes
none of the cost increase is passed through to patients. In the other extreme, costs can
be fully passed through as considered in the third row of the results table and in Figure
2. Recall that a higher p decreases treatment e¤ectiveness while a higher c increases
it. As seen in the table, the net e¤ect of an increase in p on over- and undertreatment
is stronger than the countervailing e¤ect of an (equal magnitude) increase in c. This
stems from the fact that when a cost increase is fully passed through the doctors prot
margin and hence preferences remain unchanged while the patient faces a higher price
and so prefers less treatment. On net, preferences diverge further so that treatment is
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less appropriate and the expected utilities of the doctor and patient decline.
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In solid, equilibrium treatments when
p = 0:1 and c = 0:05. In dashed, the
patients preferred treatment as a function
of state.
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In solid, equilibrium treatments when
p = 0:15 and c = 0:1. In dashed, the
patients preferred treatment as a function
of state.
5 Insurance: Moral Hazard and Communication
While doctors nancial incentives are often cited as a cause of rising health care
costs, another commonly identied culprit is that most patients pay for treatment
with the aid of health insurance (DOJ and FTC report, 2004). Although insurance
companies actively manage coverage to deny unnecessary medical procedures, much
of the decision-making power still rests with the patient, who faces a fraction of the
full charge for a medical service and may not fully internalize its cost (van Dijk et.
al., 2013). The patient may thereby undergo unnecessary procedures, i.e., the moral
hazard of insurance.
On the other hand, in light of the results of the previous section, a patient that pays
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only a fraction of the treatment cost has incentives that are more closely aligned with
those of the doctor, which should result in more appropriate treatment on average.
In the ensuing analysis, we explore the trade-o¤ between moral hazard and treatment
e¤ectiveness and demonstrate that treatment e¤ectiveness dominates.
We augment the model by introducing an ex-ante stage, at which a patient pur-
chases an insurance contract. The contract species the patients coinsurance rate
 2 [0; 1] and premium P (), so that the patients expected utility is
up() =  1
2
(   a())2   pa  P ():
When a policy with coinsurance rate  has been purchased the premium P () is sunk
and the patient prefers a weakly higher treatment for all health states than without
insurance:
ap() =    p:
We assume that the insurance market is competitive and P () is actuarially fair, thus
P () = (1  )pE[a( j )]:
Conditional on a treatment plan insurance does not save the patient money: his
ex-post payment is reduced and instead shifted to a sunk payment up-front. However,
the purchase of insurance commits the patient to be more likely to accept treatment,
thereby potentially changing the amount and e¤ectiveness of treatment he receives in
equilibrium. To formalize this, we characterize an equilibrium of the doctor and patient
interaction with insurance:
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Proposition 5 Let 3p  c  1
2
and  2 [0; 1]. Then m(), a(m), and (m) constitute
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium when dened as follows. The doctor prescribes
m() =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
p  c if 0   < (1 + 2)p  c
(3 + 4)p  3c if (1 + 2)p  c    (2 + 4)p  2c
 + p  c if (2 + 4)p  2c <   1
The patient accepts treatment if and only if prescribed as above and has beliefs
(m) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if 0  m < p  c
(1+2)p c
2
if m = p  c
m (p c)
2
if p  c < m < (3 + 4)p  3c
3(1+2)p 3c
2
if m = (3 + 4)p  3c
m  (p  c) if (3 + 4)p  3c < m
Note that the equilibrium described in the previous section is a special case of the
equilibrium with insurance in which  = 1. Figure 3 illustrates the e¤ect of more
insurance (lower ). Region A depicts health states for which treatment increases as
the result of added insurance and thus corresponds to the moral hazard e¤ect. Region
B depicts health states for which the patient undergoes less treatment when buying
more insurance. This e¤ect arises because a patient with lower coinsurance is less likely
to reject, and consequently the doctors incentive to overstate his diagnosis is reduced.
Figure 3 thus demonstrates that the moral hazard e¤ect on average treatment is o¤set
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Figure 2: A decrease in  (more insurance) increases expected treatment by the area
of region A but decreases it by the area of region B. For   U [0; 1] these two exactly
balance so that expected treatment is constant.
by the reduction in overtreatment stemming from a closer alignment of doctor and
patient incentives.
The proof of Proposition 6 below shows that the expected level of equilibrium
treatment is independent of . In fact, as in the previous section the average treatment
remains E[] + (p   c), that which would ensue if the doctor induced his rst-best
treatment for every illness. This demonstrates that an increase in the coinsurance 
rate merely reallocates health expenditures from ex-ante to ex-post, while keeping the
sum of these two expenditures constant. This implies that the e¤ect on doctor and
patient welfare is entirely through the e¤ect on communication, and communication is
best when doctor and patient incentives are closest, i.e., the patient is fully insured.
Proposition 6 Full insurance (i.e.,  = 0) is preferred by both the doctor and patient.
The proof can be found in Appendix B. In contrast to a full information context
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in which one would nd insurance increases the medical action taken for every health
state, we nd it increases treatment for states that were previously undertreated and re-
duces treatment for previously overtreated states. Therefore the gains in patient utility
derive from a better matching of treatments to health states while total health expen-
ditures are constant. For his part, the doctors expected prots from treatment are
constant in the coinsurance requirement though he too gains from the better matching
of treatments to health states.10
6 Extensions
Naive Patients
We have demonstrated that when all patients are rationally skeptical, doctorsnancial
incentives lead to over- and undertreatment which hurt both the doctor and the patient.
On the other hand, the classic PID model may be interpreted as one in which all
patients are naive in blindly following the doctors orders. As a robustness check, in
this section we allow for a proportion of naive patients and explore whether over- and
undertreatment remain.
Proposition 7 For a su¢ ciently small proportion of naive patients, the equilibrium
in Proposition 1 survives. Consequently there exists over- and undertreatment.
See Appendix B for the proof. The existence of naive patients gives the doctor a
new treatment option. For instance, the doctor that was indi¤erent between inducing
the minimally accepted treatment p   c and the inated treatment 7p   3c now has
10Our result is reminiscent of Dessein (2002) in which he investigates whether a principle could gain
from using an intermediary with a given bias of his choosing.
98
the option of inducing his preferred treatment between the two but only from naive
patients. When the number of naive patients is small, this option is strictly worse that
the other two, thus his incentives do not change qualitatively.
When there is a large enough number of naive patients, the doctor may eventually
deviate and induce his most preferred treatment from the naives while being rejected
by the rational patients. Solving for the equilibrium set when the number of naive
patients is large is tedious and beyond the scope of this work. However, we can quite
easily obtain the following result.
Proposition 8 When there is a positive measure of rational patients, there exists no
separating equilibrium.
Proof Conjecture a separating equilibrium and note that since all equilibria are monotone
in induced treatment (Lemma 2, Appendix A), there must exist a largest type ^ such
that all treatments proposed by types  < ^ are rejected by the 1  rational patients.
Then, a type just below ^ can misreport a slightly higher illness and in doing so reduce
his utility from treating naive patients marginally while increasing his utility from now
treating rational patients discretely.
The proposition above guarantees pooling regions, which we believe ought to lead
to regions of over- and undertreatment as in our main model.
It is also interesting to consider the limiting case in which all patients are naive,
as would be under classic PID. Here the equilibrium is fully separating and there is
no information loss. Compared to the equilibrium in Proposition 1, both outcomes
have the same expected treatment however the equilibrium with all naive patients has
more appropriate treatment and is therefore preferred by the doctor and patient. This
99
nding is similar to Dessein (2002) who demonstrates that full delegation is superior
to Krishna and Morgans (2001) closed rule model for low levels of bias.
Second Opinions
Our model has assumed thus far that the patients only alternative to a doctors rec-
ommendation is of taking no action at all. In reality, patients often have the option to
consult a second or third doctor for an additional opinion and alternative treatment
options. For simplicity and to retain focus on the communication game we do not
consider doctors with heterogeneous levels of expertise but rather the possible e¤ect of
competition between homogenous doctors on doctor-patient communication.
If the patient can visit multiple doctors costlessly then a fully separating equilib-
rium exists. Each doctor recommends the patients preferred action while the patient
visits every doctor and accepts treatment only if all recommendations are the same. If
recommendations diverge the patient believes the true health state is zero and rejects.
From the perspective of the doctor, if his competitors send fully separating recommen-
dations he gains nothing by misrepresenting his information, as this induces the patient
immediately to reject.
It is more realistic however that getting a second opinion has some positive cost.
Then a fully separating equilibrium in which each doctor recommends the patients
preferred action cannot exist, since if it did no patient would incur search costs to
obtain a second opinion. But given no patient searches, each doctor has incentive
to deviate for every state. Instead, there exists an equilibrium in which all doctors
prescribe as in Proposition 1. The patient does not search since his perceived return
to doing so is zero, and instead also follows his strategy in Proposition 1.
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The no-search result is an application of the Diamond paradoxwhich states there
is no equilibrium in which search occurs when the cost of search is positive (Diamond,
1971). The existence of a search cost brings about a hold-up problem that allows each
doctor to behave as a monopolist: a doctor o¤ering a second opinion can infer what
message the rst doctor sent and undercut it by some small amount " > 0 less than the
search cost. Anticipating this, the patient does not search in the rst place. Note that
in a di¤erent setting Krishna and Morgan (2001b) reach the similar conclusion that
no additional information can be gained by visiting a second expert, while Pitchik and
Schotter (1993) nd doctor opportunism can be competed away only if a su¢ ciently
large proportion of consumers have no search costs.
7 Conclusion
The classic theory of physician induced demand posits that nancially incentivized doc-
tors overprescribe medical services to patients who accept the doctors orders. When
allowing for patients to be rationally skeptical of the doctors motives we discover
the classic PID approach understates the negative welfare e¤ects of the doctors in-
centives. Though patients are skeptical, in equilibrium doctors still induce the same
average treatment as they would if patients blindly accepted the doctorsrst-best
treatment, thus conrming that PID still exists in our context. However, we also
discover an informational e¤ect in which the prescribed treatment is on average less
appropriate, stemming from doctors strategically misdiagnosing to convince patients
to accept treatment. We nd that the informational e¤ect is of a similar magnitude as
the classic PID e¤ect, and sometimes may be the dominant e¤ect.
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We use our framework to conclude health insurance reduces the incidence and
severity of over- and undertreatment. It is well-understood that the presence of health
insurance can induce moral hazard in that a patient who pays only a fraction of his
medical bill is likely to obtain more treatment. However, we uncover a countervailing
e¤ect in which the presence of insurance increases the appropriateness of treatment
by more closely aligning the incentives of the doctor and the patient. In our model
this new e¤ect completely dominates the moral hazard e¤ect, so that in equilibrium
when the patient purchases more insurance his average treatment remains xed while
its e¤ectiveness increases.
The impact of nancial incentives on treatment appropriateness can be expressed
in terms of over- and undertreatment. Both of these phenomena persist for alter-
nate model specications in which some patients are naive while others are rationally
skeptical, or in which the patient can obtain a second opinion at a small cost.
In addition to highlighting that the classic PID model understates the e¤ect of the
doctors nancial incentives, we also contribute to literature on partial delegation. In
a similar setting to ours, Krishna and Morgan (2001) describe an equilibrium which
dominates all equilibria in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) framework but leave open
whether the equilibrium they nd is most informative in their environment. We build
on their work by applying the Cho Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion and characterizing
the equilibrium set in a more general framework that nests both our and their model.
We conrm their equilibrium is in fact the most informative in their parameter space.
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Appendix A: Existence and Informativeness Proofs
For the sake of generality and to facilitate comparison with Krishna and Morgan (2001)
and Gilligan Krehbiel (1989), we use the following model. Let the utilities of the doctor
and the patient be
ud(aj) =  1
2
(   a)2 + bda
up(aj) =  1
2
(   a)2   bpa
The doctors preferred treatment is ad() = +bd and the patients preferred treatment
is ap() =    bp, in which bd and bp are both weakly positive. The patients outside
option treatment is 0  s < 1  bd, so that the outside option is guaranteed to be lower
than the doctors maximal preferred treatment.
Note that our model is a special case in which bd = p   c, bp = p, and s = 0 and
the Gilligan Kriehbel (1989) and Krishna Morgan (2001) model is also a special case
in which bd = xc, bp = 0, and 3xc < s < 1  xc.
In what follows we establish several lemmas, characterize the set of equilibria, and
then use informativeness to select a particular equilibrium. In doing so we provide a
proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 3.
Preliminary Results
Lemma 2 Equilibrium treatments weakly increase in the health state .
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Proof This follows from a single crossing property argument. Toward a contradiction
there exist states  and 0 such that  < 0 and in equilibrium a() > a(0). If the doctor
is best responding in state , then ud(a(); )  ud(a(0); ) and his ideal treatment
is weakly closer to a() than to a(0). However, in state 0 > , the doctors ideal
treatment is even higher which implies ud(a(
0); 0) < ud(a(); 
0), and thus leads to a
contradiction.
Lemma 3 Suppose treatment a0 is pooled on
 
; 

and ad() > a
0. Then there is a
discrete jump to the next induced treatment a00 = 2
 
 + bd
 a0 and it is pooled at least
out to b   + 2 (bd + bp)  a0 + s.
Proof By continuity of the doctors utility function, the type  doctor must be indif-
ferent between inducing treatment a0 and a00; that is,
a00   ad
 


= ad
 

  a0 () a00 = 2   + bd  a0:
The treatment a00 is pooled because types  >  in the neighborhood of  prefer a lower
treatment than a00 but treatments a 2 (a0; a00) are not inducible.
In order for patients to accept a00, their posterior  must be su¢ ciently high. That is,
the the minimal b must satisfy
a00   (  bp) =   bp   s() b =  + 2 (bd + bp)  a0 + s:
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These rst two Lemmas demonstrate that all equilibria have some regularities, and
we later use these results to classify equilibria into a manageable number of categories.
The following two lemmas are intended to reduce later work by performing commonly
recurring calculations in the ensuing proof.
Lemma 4 The patient accepts a0 > s on

; 

only if a0 + s+ 2bp   + .
Proof If the patients preferred treatment    bp is above a0 then a0 > s is accepted.
If a0 >    bp > s then, due to the quadratic loss utility, a0 is rejected if it is farther
away from   bp than is the outside option s. That is
a0   (  bp)  (  bp)  s () a0 + s+ 2bp   + :
If a0 > s    bp then a0 is rejected.
Lemma 5 Suppose treatments ax and ay are accepted in equilibrium and all treatments
a0 2 (ax; ay) are rejected. For any such o¤-the path treatment a0, the lowest beliefs
admitted by the intuitive criterion are  = a
0+ax
2
  bd and the deviant message is
rejected if and only if ax  2 (bd + bp) + s.
Proof The lowest permissible belief is  = (ad)
 1  a0+ax
2

= a
0+ax
2
  bd, as lower types
prefer treatment ax, which gives them at least their equilibrium payo¤, to treatment
a0. In order to reject a deviant message, conditional on the patients belief the distance
from his preferred treatment to a0 must be greater than the distance to the outside
option s:
a0   (  bp)  (  bp)  s() ax  2 (bd + bp) + s:
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Corollary 5 Let a be the highest treatment induced in equilibrium such that there is a
jump to the next highest induced treatment. If a > 2 (bd + bp) + s then the equilibrium
fails the intuitive criterion. Conversely, if a  2 (bd + bp) + s then beliefs consistent
with the intuitive criterion can support the equilibrium.
Equilibrium Classication
We classify equilibria into two categories: those in which the patient sometimes takes
his outside option s and those in which he does not. We will show that depending
on parameters the most informative equilibrium can be found in either category. To
simplify the presentation of the equilibrium characterization, within each category we
focus only on equilibria with the smallest pooling regions. We subsequently show that
within a category, an equilibrium with smaller pooling regions is more informative than
an equilibrium with larger pooling regions.
Equilibria in which treatment s is not induced
We decompose all equilibria in which s is not induced into subclasses of equilibria, each
subclass corresponding to a lowest induced treatment a1. We demonstrate that once
a1 is chosen, there is little freedom in the remaining construction of the equilibrium.
Proposition 9 Let a1 be the lowest induced treatment. In any equilibrium that satises
the intuitive criterion in which treatment s is not induced, the doctors message function
is of one of the two following forms:
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Figure 3: An equilibrium in which s = 1
20
is not induced; a1 = 110 = bp, bd =
1
8
.
i. If a1 2 (s; bd) then the doctor prescribes
m () =
8>>>><>>>>:
a1  2 [0; bd + s+ 2bp]
4 (bd + bp) + 2s  a1  2 (bd + s+ 2bp; 3bd + 4bp + 2s  a1)
 + bd  2 [3bd + 4bp + 2s  a1; 1]
ii. If a1 2 [bd; 2 (bd + bp) + s] then the doctor prescribes
m () =
8>>>><>>>>:
a1  2 [0; a1 + s+ 2bp]
a1 + 2s+ 2bd + 4bp  2 (a1 + s+ 2bp; a1 + 2s+ bd + 4bp)
 + bd  2 [a1 + 2s+ bd + 4bp; 1]
and all such messages are accepted.
Proof First, in this type of equilibrium the doctors preferred treatment is above s
for every illness, that is bd > s. Otherwise, there would be at least one  for which
107
the doctors preferred treatment is the patients outside option, and in equilibrium this
treatment is induced.
Next, consider the lowest induced treatment a1 and note that a1 > s. This follows
because a1 6= s by hypothesis and if a1 < s then any type that induces a1 would deviate
to inducing treatment s. By Lemma 2, a1 must be induced on some interval  2 [0; 1),
and by Lemma 4, 1  a1 + s + 2bp in order for the patient to accept. We dene
1 = a1 + s+ 2bp as the minimal right endpoint necessary to induce acceptance of a1.
By inspection ad(1) > a1, meaning that the highest type to induce a1 strictly
prefers a higher treatment. By Lemma 3 this implies at 1 there is a jump in treatment
up to a specic treatment a2 = 2(1+ bd)  a1, and that treatment at a2 is also pooled
on an interval (1; 2].
The endpoint 2 plays an important role. First, note that the treatment a2 is
higher than the doctors preferred treatment in the neighborhood of 1, in fact the
doctor must induce a2 for all states  > 1 for which his preferred treatment is lower,
i.e. 2  (ad) 1(a2). The question then is whether 2 = (ad) 1(a2) is su¢ ciently large
to induce the patient to accept, or whether it must be made larger. We now argue that
whenever 2 needs to be larger, the equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion.
If 2 > (ad)
 1(a2) then there must be a jump above a2 to the next highest induced
treatment. But by Corollary 5 the intuitive criterion is only satised if a2 is su¢ ciently
small. Note that
a2 = 2(1 + bd)  a1  2((a1 + s+ 2bp) + bd)  a1
= a1 + 2s+ 4bp + 2bd > 2(bd + bp) + s
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Thus, since a2 > 2(bd + bp) + s, a jump above a2 means the intuitive criterion is not
satised. By Lemma 3, 2 = 1 + 2(bd + bp)   a1 + s is the lowest endpoint of this
pooling region for which the patients posterior is su¢ ciently high to accept. To ensure
no jump occurs, it is necessary that
(ad)
 1 (a2)  2
() 21 + bd   a1  1 + 2 (bd + bp)  a1 + s
() 1  bd + s+ 2bp (1)
That no jump occurs for any treatment above a2 also implies that the doctor obtains
his preferred treatment for all states greater than 2.
We can now classify the equilibria in terms of a1. If a1 > 2 (bd + bp) + s then by
Corollary 5 no equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion. If a1 2 [bd; 2(bd + bp) + s]
then 1 = a1+s+2bp satises condition (1) and we obtain equilibrium characterization
(ii). If a1 2 (s; bd] then 1 is too small to satisfy condition (1), thus 1 = bd + s + 2bp
is the smallest endpoint that can be used, and this obtains the characterization (i).
Equilibria in which treatment s is induced
This equilibrium set is indexed by the highest state  = s for which treatment s
is induced. Once s is xed, again the way an equilibrium may be constructed is
substantially restricted.
Lemma 6 The lowest state for which treatment s is induced is s = maxf0; s  bdg.
Proof First suppose s > bd. If s > s bd then there exists a type that prefers to induce
s and is not doing so, which is a contradiction. If s < s   bd, then types  < s either
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pool or separate. They cannot separate since there is a type  2 (s; s  bd) that would
defect from sending message s. If they pool then beliefs that reject o¤-the-equilibrium-
path messages m < s in the neighborhood of s fail the intuitive criterion. When such a
message is received the highest permissible belief is the doctor type indi¤erent between
s and m; however, if the doctor is indi¤erent then the patient strictly prefers the lower
treatment and so accepts m.
If s < bd then the doctors preferred treatment is above s for every state, and given
that s is induced for any state , by Lemma 2 it must be induced for all states from 0
to .
Lemma 7 In any equilibrium that satises the intuitive criterion, the doctor induces
his preferred treatment for  < s.
Proof First, it is an equilibrium for m() =  + bs for  < s   bs because it is a best
response for the doctor if the patient accepts and a best response for the patient since he
infers the true state and prefers a treatment even lower than what the doctor prescribes.
It is also the case that any treatment a 2 [bd; bd+s] cannot be o¤ the equilibrium path,
since that would imply the treatment is rejected but no beliefs satisfying the intuitive
criterion could support this.
Lemma 8 The treatment s is induced on a set of positive measure, that is there exists
s > s so that s is induced on [s; s].
Proof Suppose not. There are two cases. First, the separating region may continue
locally for  > s. But this is impossible as the message s + " allows the patient to
deduce the state is s + "   bd to which s is the patients best response. The second
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case is that a next inducible treatment a1 is discretely higher than s. But this fails as
there would exist types s+ "2 that would defect to the inducible message s.
We have thus established that s = maxf0; s   bdg in every equilibrium, and the
choice in equilibrium construction begins with the choice s.
Proposition 10 Let [s; s] denote the set of illnesses for which treatment s is induced.
In any equilibrium s = maxf0; s bdg. Furthermore, any equilibrium in which treatment
s is induced has one of the following two forms:
i. If s 2 (s; s+ bd + 2bp] then the doctor prescribes
m () =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
 + bd  2 [0; s]
s  2 [s; s]
2s+ 2bd   s  2 (s; s+ 2bd + 2bp)
s+ 4 (bd + bp)  2 [s+ 2bd + 2bp; s+ 3bd + 4bp]
 + bd  2 [s+ 3bd + 4bp; 1]
ii. If s 2 s+ bd + 2bp; 1+s bd2  then the doctor prescribes
m () =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
 + bd  2 [0; s]
s  2 [s; s]
2s+ 2bd   s  2 (s; 2s+ bd   s)
 + bd  2 [2s+ bd   s; 1]
If s 2 (s+ bp; s+ bd + 2bp) then no equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion.
Proof The type (i) equilibrium occurs for smaller values of s and has three pooling
regions while the type (ii) equilibrium occurs for larger values of s and has two pooling
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Figure 4: An equilibrium in which s = 2
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is induced; s = 3
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Figure 5: An equilibrium in which s = 3
10
is induced; s = 1
2
, bp = 120 , bd =
1
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.
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regions. When s = s + bd + 2bp, which is on the border between the two equilibrium
regions, the equilibrium looks the same when evaluated by either the type (i) or type
(ii) characterization. This is because in the type (i) characterization the top pooling
region shrinks to nothing.
First we consider s 2 (s; s+bd+2bp]. Since at  = s the doctors preferred treatment
is strictly larger than s, there is a jump to the next highest treatment which by Lemma
3 is a1 = 2 (s+ bd)   s. In order for treatment a1 to be accepted, again by Lemma 3
it must pool at least out to 1 = s + 2bd + 2bp. By inspection, the doctors preferred
treatment at 1 is above a1 and thus there is a jump to a2 = s + 4(bd + bp). The
treatment a2 is computed again using Lemma 3, and surprisingly is not a function of
s. This observation is used in our later discussion of informativeness.
The pooling region at a2 must extend out to at least the state for which a2 is the
doctors preferred treatment, namely 2 = s+3bd+4bp. By inspection, this makes the
patients posterior strictly greater than what is necessary to induce him to accept. For
states  > 2, the doctors preferred treatments a() =  + bd are induced.
The previous construction is well-dened up to s = s + bd + 2bp, at which point
2 1 = 0. For s > s+bd+2bp, only two pooling regions can be supported and we nd
ourselves in a type (ii) equilibrium. Treatment a1 = 2s+ 2bd   s is constructed in the
same manner as before. Previously, in order to induce acceptance it was necessary for
the pooling region to extend beyond (ad)
 1(a1), thus creating another jump. However,
now at (ad)
 1(a1) the patients posterior is larger than what is necessary for acceptance,
hence the pooling region ends at 1 = 2s+ bd  s, beyond which the doctor induces his
preferred treatments for every state.
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Lastly, when s is su¢ ciently large the separating region disappears. This happens
at s = 1
2
(1+ s  bd). Equilibria in this range are comprised of two pooling regions, one
at s and one at a much higher treatment. It can be shown that these are easily ruled
out on the basis of informativeness and we omit their characterization here.
Corollary 6 An equilibrium in Proposition 10 survives the intuitive criterion unless
s 2 (s+ bp; s+ bd + 2bp).
Proof By Corollary 5, no jumps may be supported above a = 2(bd + bp) + s. This
rules out type (i) equilibria in which a1 > 2(bd + bp) + s but leaves in tact all type (ii)
equilibria.
Equilibrium Selection Using Informativeness
Recall that previously we characterized equilibria using the smallest allowable pooling
regions. For instance, in the class of equilibria in which treatment s is not induced, the
smallest treatment a1 was induced out to 1 so that the patients posterior is su¢ ciently
high to accept and the and doctors preferred treatment at 1 was at least as large as
a1. Specically, at least one of these constraints was required to bind. However, an
equilibrium could also be supported in which this pooling region was extended and
similar such decisions could have been made in other equilibrium classes. It seems
unlikely that increasing pooling beyond the constraints improves informativeness, and
we demonstrate that doing so results in a mean-preserving spread in treatment. The
following lemmas will apply to both classes of equilibrium discussed above.
Lemma 9 Let a1 be a pooled treatment ending at 1 so that ad(1) > 1. Let there
also be only one pooling treatment a2 > a1 ending at 2 at which ad(2) = a2. Then
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constructing an equilibrium with a higher a1 creates a mean preserving spread in a() 
. Similarly, if any pooled treatment a0 can stop at (ad)
 1 (a0) but instead is extended
beyond it such that another pooled treatment a00 > a0 exists, then increasing the 0, the
endpoint of a0, is a mean preserving spread.
Proof We rst show E [   a] is constant. Let " > 0 be given and compare any 1 to
1+". It su¢ ces to show the unconditional expected treatment on [1; 21 + 2"+ bd   a1]
is constant. This follows since
(1 + bd   a1) (21 + 2bd   a1) +
Z 21+bd a1+2"
21+bd a1
( + bd) d
= "a1 + (1 + "+ bd   a1) (21 + 2"+ 2bd   a1)
We now show V ar [   a] increases. By construction, a1 and a2 are equidistant from
1+bd and thus E

( + bd   a)2

is higher for larger 1 while E [( + bd   a)]2 is invari-
ant. The results follows since V ar [   a] = V ar [ + bd   a]. By a similar calculation,
extending a pooled treatment a0 beyond (ad)
 1 (a0) is also a mean preserving spread.
The previous lemma applies to equilibria in Proposition 9 for the selection of 1
and 2, to type (i) equilibria in Proposition 10 for the selection of 1 and 2, and to
type (ii) equilibria in Proposition 10 for the selection of 1.
Proposition 11 Suppose bd  s. Then the equilibrium in Proposition 10 in which
s = s+ bp is the most informative equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion.
Proof Recall that when bd  s an equilibrium in which s is not induced cannot be
supported. Thus we only examine equilibria in which s is induced. First suppose the
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equilibrium is of type (i), so that s 2 (s; s+bd+2bp). An explicit calculation reveals that
the unconditional mean of a() is invariant to s, while the variance of  a is minimized
at s = s+ bp. For later comparison, we note here that V ar[   a] = 43(bd + bp)3. Now
consider an equilibrium of type (ii), in which s + bd + 2bp  s  12(1 + s   bd). By
Lemma 9, increasing s in this region corresponds to a mean preserving spread.
Corollary 7 The equilibrium in Proposition 8 of Krishna and Morgan (2001) (in which
bp = 0 and s = s) is most informative.
Proposition 12 Let bd > s. Then, restricting attention to equilibria that survive
the intuitive criterion, either the equilibrium in Proposition 9 in which a1 = bd is most
informative or the equilibrium in Proposition 10 in which s = s+bp is most informative.
Proof In this parameter range both equilibria in which treatment s is induced and
equilibria in which treatment s is not induced may be supported. Our strategy is to
identify the most informative equilibrium, i.e. the one with the lowest V ar(   a()),
in both classes and then compare the informativeness of the two winning equilibria.
The results come form an explicit computation but we provide some intuition below.
First, for equilibria in which s is not induced, as in Proposition 9, the most infor-
mative equilibrium is the one in which a1 = bd. Here, a higher value for a1 increases
the interval [0; 1] and keeps the interval [1; 2] constant, which ends up resulting in
higher variance. For a lower value of a1, the interval [0; 1] remains the same and the
interval [1; 2] increases. An explicit computation conrms that a1 = bd is the most
informative and yields
V ar(   a()) = 2
3
(bd + 2bp + s)
3 (2)
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Next, for equilibria in which s is induced, as in Proposition 10, the most informative
equilibrium is the one in which s = s + bp. Here, it can be seen using Lemma 9 that
any move above or below s = s + bp is a mean preserving spread. Again, an explicit
computation reveals that
V ar(   a())
=  1
4
s4 + s3bd +
1
3
s3   3
2
s2b2d   s2bd + sb3d + sb2d  
1
4
b4d + b
3
d + 4b
2
dbp + 4bdb
2
p +
4
3
b3p
(3)
Lastly, comparing these two expressions we nd that either can dominate the other
depending on bias parameters bd and bp.
Corollary 8 If bp > bd > s then the most informative equilibrium that survives the
intuitive criterion is the equilibrium from Proposition 9 in which a1 = bd.
The proof follows from comparing expressions 2 to 3 when bd = bp and then taking
a derivative with respect to bp.
Appendix B: Other Proofs
Proof of Corollary 4 We demonstrate the existence of p and c such that Up(ap) +
Up(aeqm) < 2Up(a

d). Let p = c =
1
4
so that 3p  c = 1
2
. A calculation shows
2Up(a

d) =  
1
4
>  25
96
=   3
32
  1
6
= Up(a

p) + Up(aeqm).
Because the payo¤ functions are continuous, the parameter space for which the in-
equality holds has positive measure.
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Proof of Proposition 4 In our model the di¤erence in actions grows with the in-
terval of over- and undertreatment and expected utility declines in it. Thus it su¢ ces
to track increases in the interval on which over- and undertreatment occur. Expected
undertreatment is (3p  c)   (2p  c) = p, which increases in p, is constant with re-
spect to c, and increases for an equal increase in p and c (xed markup). Expected
overtreatment is (6p  2c)  (3p  c) = 3p  c, which increases in p, decreases in c, and
increases for an equal increase in p and c (xed markup).
Ud (a ()) =  1
2
E

(a ()  )2+ (p  c)E [a ()]
Up (a ()) =  1
2
E

(a ()  )2  pE [a ()]
These functions share the quadratic loss term and so their derivatives will share the
terms d
dc
E

(a ()  )2 =  2 (3p  c)2 and d
dp
E

(a ()  )2 = 6 (3p  c)2. A calcu-
lation shows
dUp
dc
= (3p  c)2 + (p  c) + p > 0
dUp
dp
=  3 (3p  c)2   p  1
2
< 0
dUd
dc
= (3p  c)2   (p  c)  1
2
< 0
dUd
dp
=  3 (3p  c)2 + (p  c) + 1
2
R 0
where this last term is ambiguous since, for example, letting p = c it is positive when
p < 1
2
p
6
but negative when p > 1
2
p
6
. It follows from above that dUd
dc
+ dUd
dp
< 0 and
dUp
dc
+ dUp
dp
< 0.
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Proof of Proposition 6 First note that total expected treatment is constant in ,
=
Z (1+2)p c
0
(p  c) d +
Z (2+4)p 2c
(1+2)p c
((3 + 4) p  3c) d +
Z 1
(2+4)p 2c
( + p  c) d
= p  c+ 1
2
and thus @E[a]
@
= 0. It therefore su¢ ces to show that the treatment is more accurate,
i.e., that
R 1
0
 (   a)2d is decreasing in . This follows from di¤erentiating
Z (1+2)p c
0
 1
2
(   (p  c))2 d +
Z (2+4)p 2c
(1+2)p c
 1
2
(   ((3 + 4) p  3c))2 d
+
Z 1
(2+4)p 2c
 1
2
(   ( + p  c))2 d
with respect to  to nd  2p (p  c+ 2p)2 < 0 since p  c. Thus  = 0 is optimal
for the patient.
Proof of Proposition 7 Type 1 = 3p   c has most incentive to defect from any
equilibrium as his equilibrium action is farthest from his preferred. It su¢ ces to nd 
such that this type is indi¤erent between his equilibrium payo¤and the payo¤obtained
from defecting and having  consumers take action ad (1) and the remaining (1  )
take action zero:
ud(1; a = p  c) = ud (1; a =  + p  c) + (1  )ud(1; a = 0)
A solution  2 (0; 1) exists as Ud(1; a = 0) < Ud(1; a = p c) < ud (1; a =  + p  c).
Thus whenever    our equilibrium survives unchanged.
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Conclusion
This dissertation has examined two common and economically signicant market set-
tings in which asymmetric information has potentially large welfare e¤ects: the intro-
duction of new products versions and the communication between doctor and patient
and resulting treatment decision. In each case matters are not as straightforward as
they might seem. Given that rms mostly introduce improved new versions of their
products, consumers rationally expect new versions to be better, which in turn e¤ects
the incentive to introduce new versions and thus consumer beliefs. I show that new
product versions are improved on average, but trivial or even harmful new versions
may occasionally be introduced. Also, the desire to show o¤ quality by introducing
a new version serves to o¤set an existing market ine¢ ciencyArrows underinvest-
ment problemso that welfare may actually be higher when consumers are initially
uninformed of product quality.
In contrast to the introduction of new product versions, asymmetric information and
di¤ering incentives will always cause a welfare loss in the doctor-patient communication
setting. What is most interesting here is the manner in which this welfare loss arises.
While the classic physician-induced demand hypothesis holds in the aggregate so that
the patient receives more treatment than he would like on average, the interaction
of patient skepticism and the doctors incentives further exacerbates the welfare loss.
The doctor severely exaggerates his diagnosis for some illnesses in order to induce the
patient to accept treatment, while for other illnesses the doctor recommends a light
treatment to prevent the patient from selecting his outside option of no treatment.
This leads to over- and undertreated, respectively. Thus the strategic communication
e¤ect causes treatment to be less medically appropriate on average and therefore lowers
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welfare. Interestingly, insurance can alleviate the communication problem and increase
welfare notwithstanding the traditional moral hazard problem by better aligning the
nancial incentives of doctors and patients.
While the chapters of this dissertation have uncovered many insights, there remain
fruitful avenues for future research. Investigating the competitive e¤ects between rms
to introduce a new product version would prove useful. Might a competitors new
version spur other rms in the market to introduce their own new versions, even if
their quality is lacking? How would the ability to sell the old and new versions of the
product simultaneously a¤ect the new product signal? And how would the welfare
analysis change if rms with endogenous R&D investment sell a durable good for
many periods? Regarding doctor and patient communication, modeling a strategic
insurer that attempts to gain information about the patients health condition and
demands justication from the doctor when seeking reimbursement would add realistic
institutional details that may a¤ect equilibrium communication.
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